Will Russia flee Crimea? Mejlis chair reveals what could push occupiers to the brink

– A year ago, Crimea was deep in Russia's rear. Today, we see queues at gas stations, fuel rationing coupons, and disruptions in logistics. How serious is this crisis for Russia, and could it spread to other sectors such as food, medicine, or communications?

– I would say that even a year ago, Crimea had already become a frontline territory for the Russians. Starting in August 2022, there were successful strikes on military targets.

It began with the attack on the Novofedorivka airbase near Saky, where Russian military aircraft were destroyed. Then there were three attacks on the Kerch Bridge. As a result, the bridge can no longer perform all the functions envisioned when it was designed.

Today, there is hardly a day without attacks on military facilities in occupied Crimea, and there are many of them. Experts estimated more than 225–230 such sites two years ago, and that number has not decreased. Crimea has been completely militarized. Russia launches missile strikes from there, and drones take off from the peninsula to attack mainland Ukraine.

Naturally, all of these military facilities are priority targets for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Just last night, if we look at the geography of the strikes, we see attacks on the Saky airbase, Kacha airbase, and Belbek airbase. There were also strikes in central Simferopol targeting military units, something even the occupation authorities were forced to acknowledge.

As for the fuel crisis, it was to be expected. It is the direct result of active and targeted operations carried out by Ukraine's Security and Defense Forces.

There is a land route running from Rostov-on-Don in Russia through occupied Mariupol and Melitopol to Crimea. The Russians call it the Novorossiya highway. Ukrainian forces now maintain fire control over certain sections of that route.

As a result, Russia's ability to transport fuel by road to occupied Crimea and nearby occupied areas of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions has been severely restricted.

Now the crisis is unfolding. It is causing a certain degree of panic among the population, which is unavoidable. The crisis directly affects people living in occupied Crimea.

Reactions vary. Some curse Ukraine. But many others signal that they are prepared to endure these hardships if they help bring Crimea's liberation closer.

We communicate every day with people in occupied Crimea. I want to emphasize that hundreds of thousands of people — Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, and representatives of other nationalities — remain devoted and loyal to the Ukrainian state. Yet when faced with these difficulties—since fuel shortages complicate life for our people living in occupied Crimea—they are ready to endure it.

Yesterday, I had a brief conversation with one resident who told me, "The most important thing is that what is happening today culminates in the swift liberation of Crimea."

People had similar hopes in 2022, when the first highly accurate strikes on Crimea began. Later, they waited for the counteroffensive, hoping it would result in the peninsula's liberation.

Now, as many experts argue that full control over the land corridor could eventually force Russia to consider evacuating and withdrawing from Crimea, people are uplifted. Their hopes are growing stronger.

But here it is important to speak honestly and directly with our people in Crimea and to explain that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are trying to do everything possible to ensure that the Crimean peninsula becomes fully blocked in terms of the Russian army’s ability to operate and supply itself.

In this context, it is clear that there are two remaining supply routes for both troops and food deliveries to Crimea.

The first is the Kerch Bridge, which we have already discussed. Although it has been significantly weakened after three explosions, it continues to perform certain functions. Vehicles and people continue to cross it, but it can no longer support heavy freight trains.

That is already a very important development. The ferry has been destroyed, and there is no longer any freight ferry connection to Crimea. This is the result of the Ukrainian Armed Forces destroying those ferries.

This road is the land corridor to Crimea. Of course, fire control is not yet full control over this route. However, if these efforts eventually result in full control over the land corridor, and if (this is a bit of speculation, as I am not a military expert) the Kerch Bridge is destroyed, then many analysts already predict that the Russians will have no choice but to figure out how to evacuate their forces from Crimea.

This is because they have no strong position at sea and do not control the Black Sea. They can occasionally deploy ships from ports located in their own territory, particularly Novorossiysk, from where they launch missiles at mainland Ukraine and then retreat again under coastal defense protection. At sea, the Russians can no longer defend the Crimean peninsula from liberation.

— How likely do you think it is that Crimea could effectively become an island in the near future, that is, will be completely cut off from Russia, given the current dynamics both on the land corridor and in the air? Do you see a scenario of de-occupation without a large-scale ground operation? And what would the transition period look like if Russian forces begin withdrawing before Ukrainian forces, such as the Armed Forces or National Guard, have entered the peninsula—would there be chaos?

— I will partly rely on some forecasts made by experts in the field of modern warfare.

Although everyone acknowledges that the Russia–Ukraine war, especially in its current phase since 2022 (when it became a full-scale war), has significantly changed perceptions of how wars are conducted and what tools are used to achieve objectives by the warring sides.

And now, amid what is to some extent a blockade (though not yet a complete blockade of occupied Crimea from the land), we are already seeing consequences, including a fuel crisis.

Some experts note with surprise that cutting supply lines to a military grouping on territory they de facto control, but where they cannot fully exercise authority due to a lack of resources, creates problems the enemy is unable to resolve.

If they cannot solve these problems, they must either abandon these territories or somehow respond. And this will also affect other theaters of military operations.