Melitopol strike and deception: Inside 2023 counteroffensive
Illustrative photo: the General Staff revealed previously unknown details of the 2023 operation (Getty Images)
The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive in the south in 2023 involved massive forces across several directions of the front simultaneously. The strike toward Melitopol had initially been planned as early as 2022, Major General Oleksandr Komarenko, Head of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff, states in an interview with RBC-Ukraine.
"There was an operational concept developed by the General Staff. The concept of this operation envisaged conducting offensive actions in the Melitopol direction, and it also defined the tasks for the other groupings, including Khortytsia," Komarenko said.
Why pressure on Bakhmut was increased before the counteroffensive
According to him, the task of Khortytsia was to carry out offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction in order to mislead the enemy about the actual direction of the main offensive. Another task of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was to fix enemy forces in place and prevent them from regrouping, after which the main strike was to be launched.
"Another task of Khortytsia was to hold Bakhmut for as long as possible to keep the enemy engaged there, and then conduct offensive actions south of the city. For Khortytsia, the focus was specifically on conducting offensive operations to improve the tactical situation," added the Head of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff.
Overall, the offensive was preceded by extensive preparation. For the operation, troop groupings were formed both for actions on the main axis and in other directions.
How many troops participated in the counteroffensive
"The grouping created for the offensive operation in the south consisted of 10 brigades of the Armed Forces and three brigades of the National Guard in the main Melitopol direction, five brigades in another direction near Velyka Novosilka, where General Sodol advanced, and one brigade in reserve," Komarenko said.
He also added that at the start of the offensive, the troops were concentrated in their initial areas and placed under the command of the respective commanders, with the exception of one mechanized brigade, which was to operate as part of the 9th Army Corps. Khortytsia operated with the forces it already had. In other words, additional brigades from other groupings were not assigned.
"The logic at the time was as follows. First, we took action. Accordingly, additional ammunition was allocated to us to show the enemy that we were preparing for something, and also to increase firepower. Then we moved to offensive operations south of Bakhmut. After that, Sodol advanced. And only then did operations begin on the main axis – toward Tokmak–Melitopol," the general added.
When the counteroffensive was initially planned
According to Komarenko, the offensive operation on the Melitopol axis was originally intended to be conducted in 2022. Planning was carried out, and the troops to be involved were determined. However, it was necessary to "secure Kherson," so the offensive was canceled, and at that time, Khortytsia transferred four brigades to neighboring units.
"The operation on the Melitopol axis lasted much longer than planned. Accordingly, there came a point when the resources accumulated at the start of the operation ran out. There arose the need to provide additional ammunition and other resources. Not all operations go according to plan, and success is not always guaranteed. Here, a direction was chosen where success was not achieved," Komarenko concluded.
Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, recently stated that the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive failed because President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other Ukrainian officials did not allocate the necessary resources.
