Escalating conflict into Russian territory - objective and historical process, Presidential Office

Ukraine finally launched a long-awaited counteroffensive in June. In response, scared Russians carried out an asymmetric act by blowing up the Kakhovka HPP, leading to one of the most significant technological disasters in recent times. However, the world's reaction to this incident has been sluggish, with even Ukraine's Western allies avoiding concrete commitments.

According to Mykhailo Podolyak, the reason behind this lies in the world's unwillingness, even after two years of war, to call a spade a spade. Consequently, the world has yet to officially designate Russia as a terrorist state with all its attendant consequences. Throughout the interview, Podolyak expressed critical views regarding Ukraine's Western allies, their excessive caution, conservatism, and timidity.

Podolyak's stance regarding Russia becomes even more categorical, stating that the process of dismantling the empire is irreversible. He predicts that chaos awaits Russia, ultimately leading to a return to relative democratization and a radical reduction of its global influence, akin to the situation in 1991.

Therefore, any negotiations with Russia at this stage are simply out of the question. Despite the many challenges that lie ahead for Ukraine, the fight must continue. "This is a monumental ideological war. And there can only be one outcome: one country wins, the other loses. There is no middle ground. For Ukraine, the middle ground means that we have lost," Podolyak says.

Here’s an abbreviated transcript of the interview.

RBC-Ukraine: Let's start with the main event of this month – the Russians' sabotage of the Kakhovka HPP. Why was the world's reaction so sluggish? Did we expect something different?

MP: No, we expect events to unfold as moderated by Ukraine, and Ukraine alone. We place our primary bet on ourselves, and that is understandable. But why such a reaction? It is because the world is not yet ready to unequivocally call a spade a spade. We should have stated that Russia is resorting to even such terrorist tactics as internally sabotaging a massive dam, causing severe flooding with far-reaching consequences.

In that case, the world would have to acknowledge that Russia is a terrorist state, and appropriate legal actions should be taken. What are these actions? It entails the clear exclusion of Russia from international institutions, mandatory sanctions against neutral countries that currently do not support a sanction policy towards Russia, and blocking of almost all markets, including oil, for Russia. These consequences would have severe implications for Russia's relations with the Global South countries.

RBC-Ukraine: The world is afraid of such abrupt steps, correct?

MP: Yes, it means an additional rupture of diplomatic relations, severance of cultural ties, and the definitive exclusion of Russia from participating in various sporting events and so on. The world is afraid to acknowledge this because, unfortunately, Russia has been fully integrated into the global space with corrupt money. Enormous amounts of money were involved. Many people were interested in this, not necessarily as direct lobbyists for Russian interests, but they were involved in this network.

RBC-Ukraine: Benefiting from it?

MP: You could say so. In general, this means that we will need to rethink what the global security space really is. Do we have international law? Are there institutions that protect international law? What are the orders of international jurisdictions? And so on. Many things will need to be reconsidered and transformed. Is the world ready for this?

The main goal is to deprive Russia of unnecessary global subjectivity. Russia should become a small Eritrea (sorry for the comparison, but it seems to me that Eritrea has more chances in the future) in terms of its influence on global politics. It is very difficult to admit that for twenty years we have been afraid of an absolutely hollow country.

RBC-Ukraine: Under the control of the Russians lies another strategically important facility, the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. Given the incident with the Kakhovka HPP, what actions can we expect from the occupiers regarding the Zaporizhia NPP? Could they potentially sabotage it, for instance?

MP: Let me address a different point first, and then we'll return to the Zaporizhia NPP.

At the beginning of the war, European and other countries were significantly concerned that Ukraine would not be able to withstand the Russian onslaught, and that Russia could pose a threat to other nations. There was fear that Russia could advance through Ukraine.

Today, it seems to me that the world now understands that Ukraine will not allow Russia to advance, not even within Ukrainian territory. Our partners understand that Ukraine has already halted Russia's progress, and there is nothing to fear. So, there is a war happening in Ukraine, but for us, everything is fine now. We will live as we did before the war. We are not afraid of rockets or bombings. We are not afraid of rusty Russian tanks rolling through our roads and so on. It's a different feeling.

This is a paradox. On the one hand, Ukraine has demonstrated that it can stop Russia and did that. Yet, on the other hand, we have rid ourselves of the fear of a Russian invasion.

Now, let's talk about the Zaporizhia NPP. Undoubtedly, Russia does not have military instruments of influence on the front line's development. They only have terrorist instruments, such as blowing up power plants. Russia has used this tool to try and convince the world that if you stop supporting Ukraine, you will force Ukraine to recognize their right to kill and torture them, recognize that they should remain on a part of Ukrainian territory, and they will continue provoking and attempting to destroy Ukraine further. But today, you must acknowledge all of this, otherwise, we will use terrorism.

However, the world understands that Ukraine will reject such proposals. Russia does have the option of targeting the Zaporizhia NPP, and we must constantly discuss it. Because the ecological disaster following the Kakhovka HPP explosion is nothing compared to the pan-European ecological catastrophe if Russia attempts to sabotage the nuclear plant. We must realize today that Russia is a terrorist country, not just a sponsor of terrorism but a terrorist country itself because it consciously uses these instruments.

RBC-Ukraine: How can we prevent a fatal scenario regarding the Zaporizhia NPP? Can we exert influence on the occupiers through sanctions, for example, regarding Rosatom (Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation – Ed.), which has managed to avoid significant sanctions despite being in the second year of the war?

MP: This is another major problem with the world – hypocrisy. Rosatom has relationships with various countries in Europe.

By the way, the President mentions that several countries, including our partners in this war, provide us with air defense systems, while private companies from these countries are allowing Russia to continue missile production.

This will lead to tragedies because, on the one hand, you provide Ukraine with defensive tools, and on the other hand, you give an attacking instrument against a sovereign country. This means that you continue the war and calmly observe civilian casualties.

In addition to targeting the nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, Russia has another instrument of influence – the destruction of social and critical infrastructure. This is what Russia is engaged in today.

Putin mentioned one simple thing: subconsciously, we understand that we will lose the war and leave Ukrainian territory. But what kind of Ukrainian territory will we leave? One that is completely devastated. We want you to feel the consequences of this war. We will destroy and burn everything you have.

Now let's discuss the preventive measures for the Zaporizhia NPP. Firstly, we need to acknowledge the risks and not pretend that there are none. Secondly, we must recognize that these risks are related to the nuclear industry. And thirdly, Ukraine has proposed a plan: a demilitarized zone and the mandatory withdrawal of all heavy equipment and personnel belonging to Russia. Only Ukrainian personnel should be present, and if you want to establish a monitoring mission by the IAEA, go ahead.

However, if you propose this not on behalf of Ukraine but on behalf of the global community, and if Russia refuses to accept it, then one sufficiently strong instrument is sanctions against Rosatom.

RBC-Ukraine: But we can see now how difficult it is for the eleventh package of sanctions to progress, which is aimed at covering various sub-sanctioned supplies to Russia. According to reputable Western media sources, it involves the French and Germans because of their economic concerns, fearing potential harm to their companies on global markets. It seems that even in the second year of the war, after tens of thousands, millions of good words about Ukraine as a democracy, and a fight for values, money still weighs more for many of our friends.

MP: Did you ever doubt that money weighs more? Let's go back to the beginning of our conversation. They understand that Russia will not win. They already understand that security is now at a much deeper level than it was at the beginning or middle of the war. They understand that Ukraine will control and moderate the war. So, what are they thinking about? They don't face any danger. They can only think about making a little more money.

Moreover, the Russians are paying premium prices, twice or thrice as much, and sometimes even five times more for the same product. It's obvious. Regardless of how it is presented in the world, it's all about business. No problems, no morality; this business has existed for ten years and even a hundred years ago.

Ukraine, as a state, works vigorously to ensure that these sanctions are implemented. The Yermak-McFaul Commission is overseeing the sanctions strictly and constantly emphasizing the need to find ways and develop preventive measures that will prevent Russia from circumventing sanctions through third countries and blocking certain sectors.

RBC-Ukraine: But when our Western friends provide us with another package of weapons, they always emphasize that this weaponry should not be used and will not be used on the sovereign territory of the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian government has promised and guaranteed this a thousand times, yet they continue to repeat it again and again.

MP: And you know the answer perfectly well: the world is not ready for responsible actions. It sounds nice in theory – within the framework of international law, when an aggressor attacks your country, you have the right to destroy any instruments, including those located on the aggressor's territory. This is written, it's a legal formula. But this is a legal formula that requires political will. In the modern world, there is a scarcity of political will.

Ukraine has that will, and we are doing everything necessary to destroy Russian occupation infrastructure on our territory. We lack the necessary tools quantitatively, and we genuinely tell our partners that attacking Russian territory makes no sense.

We explain that the war Russia is waging on Ukrainian soil will gradually spill over into Russian territory objectively because it is a historical process. When you engage in a massive invasion and do not achieve rapid victory, inevitably, you lose control over the process. Today, regardless of everything, Russia is losing control over these processes. There is virtually no power vertical; there are numerous alternative conflict centers. Look particularly at the recent relations between Prigozhin, Kadyrov, and Shoigu.

There is a separate Freedom of Russia Legion that intermittently enters various territories. Countless unidentified drones are attacking Russian territory everywhere. This is an integral part of a lost war.

Yes, there is not yet a factual defeat or a legal defeat, but Russia is losing this war, and regardless of Ukraine, all these processes of subversion, active clashes, and more will take place on Russian territory. My question is different. Why does the Western world think it can stand in front of the train of history and stop it?

RBC-Ukraine: And why is the Western world afraid to talk about the future of Russia?

MP: They are conservative. They want to live in an illusory pre-war time.

RBC-Ukraine: A time that will not return.

MP: That is impossible. Undoubtedly, Western partners would like to have a time machine and periodically return to pre-war times. I understand that perfectly well. But we live from yesterday through today to tomorrow. This is an objective process, and in this process, there will no longer be pre-war times. However, they want to live there because there were tremendous Russian funds, sufficient participation in Russian assets, and so on.

All of that is lost, and they are afraid that when it is definitively lost, there will be numerous investigations to uncover why everything happened that way at the beginning of the war. What was it? It turned out that Russia is an extremely weak state. Yes, it is large, and extensive in terms of Soviet resources, but it is not very proficient in everything. How did it happen that you scared the world? Through this fear, Russia obtained certain dividends, primarily the ability to violate international law with impunity. And then there will be many intriguing news. No one wants that.

First, they lost money. Second, the news will emerge that you participated in building this pro-Russian network. Who needs that? And most importantly, Western civilization is getting rid of a formidable enemy, as they called it, the empire of evil. Under this guise, they could have done something, imposed restrictions, and so on. And Russia enjoyed playing this game; everyone was afraid of it. But now the system will have to be rebuilt.

And here we come to an even more interesting matter. I see Western media periodically resorting to a concept I call "anonymous sources" that claim that Ukraine lacks the resources to win the war. Surely, it will be very difficult to win the war. Perhaps we need to seek options to somehow make some compromises.

In my opinion, this is all quite simplistic. These are not anonymous sources; this is anonymous primitivism because it says: we need you not to win the war because Russia should remain in the containment concept, that is, not developing as a state or an element. We will contain it through you, and thus Russia will not progress, and Russian partners will not progress because there will be constant sanctions. But this will be done at the expense of Ukraine. They explicitly tell us: we understand your power, but we don't fully believe that you can win. It's psychological pressure, nothing more.

RBC-Ukraine: Prigozhin's boisterous media activity, in the long run, may lead to something serious, some upheaval, or even a coup. Is it all just a show?

MP: It is certainly not a mere show. It will undoubtedly result in significant upheaval because Russia is already entering a tumultuous period.

Prigozhin, personally, is a provocateur who initiates these processes. Yes, he wants to establish a starting position from which he can storm the redistribution of political elites soon. However, Prigozhin personally will not gain any dividends unless he builds a political infrastructure, not just a military one. He is involved, and concerned about the war itself, but lacks the political infrastructure. He does have a media infrastructure, a "patriotic media" infrastructure.

Nevertheless, Prigozhin demonstrates that the current elite is not promising; it is dying. Today's Russian elite is a dying one that will not have significant influence soon. Moreover, likely, a substantial portion of this elite will not even exist physically.

This is again an objective process because they practically have no time left to rectify their actions, which could have ensured their personal security. It is already evident, and that is why Prigozhin is just the first among many who will signal a different reality. In this reality, there will be numerous groups attempting to negotiate a new elite consensus and form a transitional government in the Russian Federation after Putin.

Thus, Putin will not have the opportunity to transfer power through someone else; he is the ultimate subject of the Putinist elite. Not everyone fully understands this, but it is an unstoppable process. The point of no return has already been passed.

Prigozhin is the most aware of what is happening on the battlefield. He understands the war not only from the perspective of classical Russian propaganda but also anticipates the consequences soon. Therefore, he tries to protect himself from these consequences and secure a position from which he can participate in the redistribution of influence and territories, not in terms of Russia's disintegration but in terms of effective temporary control.

For example, he may claim the Leningrad region. Will that concern us? We won't really care because there will be a dozen more Prigozhins who will figure out among themselves who is the greater Prigozhin.

RBC-Ukraine: Who could potentially replace Vladimir Putin? Is there any political potential within Russia's diverse opposition? Can the opposition make at least a microscopic impact?

MP: These are two different things. Russian liberal opposition in exile is focusing not on seeking an alternative path for Russia's development. Rather, they are currently seeking opportunities to secure a place in the new and uncertain world, acting as informants of contemporary events. So-called, moral authorities without morals.

RBC-Ukraine: Impostors?

MP: They have the right to call themselves like this because, after all, they are the opposition. However, this is not our opposition, and there is no point in analyzing it. In terms of the effectiveness of what they propose, it is absolutely senseless and has no impact whatsoever on Russian reality, political process, and does not affect the course of the war.

When it comes to effectiveness, the Freedom of Russia Legion demonstrates a more impactful stance. They show that a robust resistance, even bordering on a civil war within the Russian Federation, is possible. While the Legion's size is limited, a larger force would undoubtedly lead to significant political changes in multiple Russian regions, ultimately reshaping the country's political landscape.

However, this discussion does not revolve around the opposition mentioned previously. While they may write decent feuilletons and occasionally deliver impressive speeches, their influence on the political process in Russia is negligible. Their interests lie in securing access to parliamentary elections and gaining a certain percentage of votes.

RBC-Ukraine: Can a collective Prigozhin help them to enter?

MP: Prigozhins will probably first sort out their relationship amongst themselves, and after that, everything that has been built in terms of the authoritarian vertical will be destroyed. Then the process of 1991 will begin, where relatively free elections, whether parliamentary or presidential, will take place without any difference. A large number of different parties, including classical opposition forces, will participate, and they might receive 10-15, maybe even 20 percent of the votes.

RBC-Ukraine: Will we witness the collapse of Russia in our lifetime?

MP: It's not a matter of us "witnessing" it; it is a historical process that will simply be accelerated by Putin's actions. What has Putin set in motion? I understand that Putin's plan involves the dismantling of classical imperial Russia. He has done it unknowingly. But undoubtedly, when you find yourself in such a bubble, when you don't understand what is happening in the world, and who controls resources today, you automatically initiate the process of dismantling the inappropriate logistics of your own country through statements made on behalf of that country.

They simply accelerated the demise of imperial Russia. Why? Russia developed as a weak democracy until 1997, and when the presidential elections were over, Yeltsin practically did not participate in governing the country. They gradually started entering classical Russian history, where there is a tsar and boyars, and where there is corresponding rhetoric, external and internal policies, and so on.

It's not a question of disintegration; it's a question of transforming Russia. Russia should be a much more compact country, occupying a much smaller global position. Accordingly, many ethnic regions may secede – something that was not done in 1991.

It will be a country of a completely different level. It will no longer be part of the G8, or G20, and is unlikely to be in the UN Security Council, even though it is a nuclear state. Perhaps, there will be some other mechanism.

RBC-Ukraine: International security guarantees are frequently discussed, but specifics remain scarce, limited to rumors and unofficial sources. For instance, recent reports from The New York Times suggest that the United States may offer Ukraine an Israeli model of guarantees. How accurate is this, and when and from whom can we expect assistance?

MP: I don't quite understand when we talk about a ten-year cycle of global security guarantees – what does that mean? Does it imply that there will be ongoing warfare or a frozen state of conflict? Because guarantees are only necessary during the war, following the Israeli concept – meaning the top priority is acquiring certain weapons without any quantity restrictions, and so on.

If we take a broader view of this issue, there is a relevant front today. Everything is being decided on the front. War is war; it has to reach a certain conclusion. In my opinion, any conclusion that does not restore the borders of 1991 would simply mean that the war has temporarily stopped until the next stage, which will be even more devastating for Ukraine. Despite all the challenges we face today, we must reach the end of this war.

Then, there will be a certain time before we transition from de facto NATO membership to de jure NATO membership. It will take three months, six, maybe eight. During this time, we must obtain the necessary security guarantees as we document the legal consequences of the war with the Russian Federation. There may be individuals in Russia who will try to seek revenge at some point, using cruise missiles or other means. At that moment, there must be appropriate security guarantees that all other countries will also participate in Ukraine's defense.

And after that, there is only one security system for Europe, which is NATO. I simply don't understand what other separate security systems can exist. What should it be when we already have a military alliance for democratic countries?

Therefore, in my opinion, the war is the first stage. The second stage is transitional, which involves security guarantees overseen by the President of Ukraine, ensuring that we no longer need to negotiate with someone for weapon supplies. Within the framework of security guarantees, these weapons should be automatically provided, including maximum instruments such as F-16s or ATACMS. And the third stage is the legal status of NATO membership itself.

RBC-Ukraine: What would be a good or at least acceptable outcome for us at the Vilnius Summit?

MP: The President has already stated this multiple times. More than twenty countries have already signed a declaration stating that Ukraine should become a member of NATO. Mr. Stoltenberg has clearly stated that practically all NATO countries are interested in Ukraine's membership in the alliance. The only emphasis made by the President of Ukraine is that we should not speak abstractly but rather say it clearly: we understand that during the war, you are not a NATO member, but after the war ends, a clear calendar plan is needed. No more abstract MAPs but a specific plan for accession within six months or any other timeframe to NATO.

The reason why I say it should be specific is that reforms, such as judicial reform and alignment with the legislative field of the European Union, are related to our EU membership. It's a more complex path that requires a broader package of reforms to become a member of the European Union.

Regarding NATO, I believe that war is the only fundamental criterion determining whether you can be a member of a military alliance or not. All other bureaucratic procedures will seem strange.

And who should be a member of a military alliance if not a country that has experienced a massive war, used and synchronized all NATO-produced weapons, and has been trained according to NATO standards? Moreover, a country that, in essence, de facto is already a member of NATO. Therefore, it would be strange to say that there are various bureaucratic procedures that you must go through. The President wants it to be clear for all members and to be discussed in Vilnius: we understand that war is an undeniable criterion for NATO membership, and the second component is a calendar plan.

RBC-Ukraine: The West claims that it is helping Ukraine to have a strong position at the negotiating table with Russia. But such a goal appears somewhat ambiguous. For example, we imagine that Churchill, during World War II, said to the British people that we will fight and die to have a strong position at the negotiating table with Hitler. Would that inspire the British people to fight? I don't think so.

MP: That's a difficult question. Currently, many people simply speak for the sake of speaking during the information era. They do not realize how far these words deviate from what you want to say. You find yourself thousands of kilometers away from Ukraine, and you think, "Well, let's give them some weapons so that they can reinforce themselves and then sit down at the negotiating table.

When they tell you that during an unfair war happening on your territory, you should sit at the negotiating table, it means they are telling you that you can surrender. Maybe not today; they'll let you struggle a little longer, and lose more lives, but eventually, you will sit down at the negotiating table. It means they are directly telling you to capitulate. However, the people who say this are not even aware of it.

Why? There are many words spoken today just for the sake of speaking. People do not feel the importance of what they publicly say. They might say something today and say something else tomorrow. Periodically, we hear from leaders who understand the nature of war and Russia's aggressive foreign policy: "Well, we think that at some point, negotiations should take place." It means they simply do not understand the meaning of these words.

And here we come to the possibility or impossibility of conducting negotiations. It is impossible. What negotiations can we have with a killer? What would we negotiate? To give the killer time to prepare for the next stage and finish you off while provoking you with terrorist acts, political assassinations, significantly increasing global propaganda costs, and intensifying information pressure that portrays Ukraine as Nazis? What would we negotiate? Agreeing to voluntarily kneel before Russia after sixteen months of war? Is that what we should negotiate? With whom? With people who clearly state that they hate international law, want to spit on it, and will violate it with impunity at any moment?

And one last question for all those who talk about negotiations. What will we say to the people who have lost their loved ones in this war? Because no war criminal will be held accountable if Russia does not lose. Russia has not lost; it has not lost territory, money, responsibility for war crimes under international law, its place in global organizations, or its influence on global politics. So, we would have to come and say: we fought, they died, but...

RBC-Ukraine: But "that's how it turned out".

MP: Yes. And Russia will not be held accountable for anything. This is a tremendous ideological war. And there can only be one outcome: one country wins, the other loses. There is no middle ground. For Ukraine, the middle ground means that we have lost. But today, everything that negotiations imply, and thus what we give you, is to bolster your position in negotiations, and it looks strange.

Because, firstly, we didn't need to give anything; we needed to enforce security guarantees within the Budapest Memorandum. Secondly, we shouldn't have encouraged Russia, which demonstratively entered Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine for the first time. We shouldn't have encouraged Russia to violate international law.

Thirdly, we shouldn't have allowed Russia to become an energy monopolist in Europe. Fourthly, we shouldn't have allowed Russia to dominate international institutions. Fifthly, we shouldn't have allowed Russia to build a massive propaganda network, primarily in the Global South, Latin America, and Africa.

Sixthly, we shouldn't have allowed Russia to exploit different regimes in different territories, in different regions, in terms of terrorist activity, and so on.

If you were not ready to understand, comprehend, and act on these issues, then let's not simply "give something" to Ukraine. Instead, allow Ukraine to set the right priorities in the historical process where the guilty party, in this case, Russia must be held fully accountable for its crimes.

Don't want to engage in war? Then I have a question: why wouldn't Russia, if it doesn't lose the war, want to realize its ambitions in other territories, in other regions? Why shouldn't it continue financing terrorist groups, instigating coups in other countries, and causing migration and food crises? Why should a country, amid countless military crimes, behave differently afterward?

RBC-Ukraine: Considering the start of our counteroffensive, would it be accurate to say that Russia will never advance again during this war? Even if it does, it's only a few meters per day.

MP: That question is more for our military. They understand what will happen and how events will unfold directly on the front line.

I can speak from the perspective of resourcefulness. Russia's resource depletion is evident, including its mobilization resources. Yes, they have many, but I believe our military has full control over the situation. Our military at various levels, both strategic and tactical, fully manage the situation on the front line, and they are not interested in allowing Russia to accumulate resources and launch offensive actions in any direction. Of course, some local counteroffensives by Russia may occur because it is a vast front line, stretching for 1,800 kilometers. Various events will happen, but it seems that Ukraine has complete control over everything happening on the front line today.

RBC-Ukraine: Will Russia attempt to subject Ukraine to the same difficult autumn and winter as before, with shelling and attacks on infrastructure? Should we prepare for another challenging winter?

MP: In principle, it is necessary to understand that the major war continues. And undoubtedly, we find ourselves in different conditions than before the start of the war. As long as the war continues, we need to be prepared for everything, including the understanding that Russia has limited tools to influence the course of the war. They only have terrorist instruments, one of which is the use of leftover cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and drones to attack civilian populations and critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure.

Undoubtedly, we need to invest significant funds now to complete transformers, replace and repair distribution networks. The state will take care of all this. However, in the meantime, we must understand that as long as the war continues, Russia will continue to employ the same terrorist instruments. We need to be aware of this.

Again, we must not forget that the cost of this war is immense. Either we lose, and as a state, we cease to exist. Yes, it will still be called Ukraine, but it will be a puppet, non-existent state. Or we win and overcome all obstacles in this war.