Operation Spiderweb isn't just about $7 bln in losses - Interview with Defense Express editor-in-chief

Key questions:

• Why are the losses for Russia from Operation Spiderweb irreparable?
• Does the Kremlin now have fewer opportunities to strike Ukraine?
• Should we expect retaliation from the Kremlin?

— How badly did Operation Spiderweb hit Russia and its aviation?

—This is the destruction of one-third of the air component of Russia's nuclear triad. It's more than just about money. Even if we consider purely the material aspect, the reported 7 billion in damages is objectively underestimated. Sure, you could try calculating the value of the damaged aircraft by amortization, depreciation, or estimating how much a Tu-95MS, produced back in Soviet times, might cost. But in my opinion, that's the wrong way to calculate it.

The correct way is to calculate the cost of replacing the losses. Just like with the cruiser Moskva. You can calculate how much a ship that is several decades old costs, how old it is, but a more accurate approach is to calculate how much it would cost the enemy to replace such a loss.

Russia cannot currently produce new strategic bombers, it is still assembling Tu-160s from Soviet stockpiles. They've managed to assemble only two since 2022, and reports indicate that even those are made using airframes produced during the Soviet era. As for the new PAK DA (Prospective Aviation Complex for Long-Range Aviation), they only have an approved concept and a static ground test model. Not even a prototype - they haven't even started building the first flight model yet.

In other words, they have no replacement. And to clarify: a strategic bomber is a one-of-a-kind product, its development costs astronomical sums, and they're produced in very limited numbers. That’s why the cost per unit goes through the roof.

To illustrate, the American B-2 Spirit had a per-unit cost exceeding $2 billion, because only 21 units were made, if you add up the development costs and the production costs of the aircraft. We can't objectively calculate how much such an aircraft would cost in Russia. They started developing the PAK DA back in 2009, and still haven't completed it. When they finish, if they ever do, and when they begin mass orders, then we might be able to estimate the cost. But objectively, if we count the cost of replacement, it is significantly more than 7 billion.

— Did this operation disrupt the nuclear deterrence balance between Russia and the US?

—That doesn't concern us at all. We're not a nuclear country. That's the US's problem. If the US is unhappy about something, that's not our issue. Objectively, Ukraine is not part of the nuclear deterrence paradigm, because we are not a nuclear power.

— Are the Tu-95MS, Tu-160, and Tu-22M3 all produced in Russia?

— The Tu-160s are assembled from Soviet-era stockpiles. The Soviet Union had planned to build more Tu-160s, but then it collapsed. Now they are being assembled gradually and at a very slow pace because we're talking about strategic bombers. At the time of the USSR's collapse, several incomplete airframes remained in Kazan. They started assembling them. The exact amount of this stockpile is unknown. However, it is not significant.

They do not assemble Tu-95 and Tu-22M aircraft. For the Tu-22M, they also relied on leftover stock from Soviet times — there were six incomplete aircraft, and they are working to finish them. However, many of these projects depend on components that are now under sanctions - Western-made microchips and similar parts. And not the kind from AliExpress, but the real military-grade ones. So there's a real question as to whether they will actually do so.

— Can we now say that drone attacks on Russian airfields will become more regular?

—This was a special operation that had been in preparation for quite a long time, and it was completely unpredictable. No one could even imagine that you could drive up in a truck with FPV drones and launch them remotely. That's why this operation made history, and now all specialized foreign media aren't even trying to find analogies. They openly write that this was truly a unique operation.

— Could this operation or similar ones push the Russians to realize that the war needs to be ended?

— Good question. I don't have an answer to it. I want to believe that, but I can't say it for certain.

— Can such strikes really affect Russia's missile attacks on Ukraine?

— Absolutely. There are very few carriers of the Kh-101 missiles. The estimates are highly speculative. In general, it's unclear how many of these aircraft they have. There are different categories. There's the number in documents, which varies: some sources say 40, others 60 — that's the range. But that's just how many planes they theoretically have.

From that number in documents, you need to subtract the ones that are not airworthy - the so-called corpses. Aircraft that definitely won't fly anymore. They've already become sources of spare parts and have been cannibalized. The process of dismantling a machine is called cannibalization. So, part of those 40–60 aircraft have already been cannibalized and definitely won't fly again.

If we take the remaining Tu-95s, not all of them can carry Kh-101 missiles. Some haven't been modernized and can only carry Kh-555s, which the enemy uses very sparingly because they are no longer in production. The Kh-101 doesn't fit into the internal rotary launcher, so it can only be mounted on underwing pylons.

So, from the total number, we subtract those that aren't airworthy and those that can't carry the Kh-101. I'm confident the operation was planned so precisely that we most likely hit only those aircraft that are used for missile strikes — that is, those that can carry the Kh-101. If the enemy has fewer Kh-101 missile carriers, then it can launch fewer missiles.

To understand how many aircraft the enemy may have that are not airworthy. We have more precise information about the Tu-160s because very few were produced. Currently, Russia has between 12 and 18 Tu-160s. Of those, 5 are at the Kazan plant undergoing repairs, servicing, or modernization. Others are scattered across airbases, just waiting for their turn, because there's no room left at the factory.

— Is Russia prepared for retaliation, or is that more of an empty threat?

Here's what needs to be emphasized. Russia attacked with Kh-101 missiles and the aircraft that were destroyed at those airbases. They targeted Ukraine and civilian infrastructure. These missiles killed civilians. They used these missiles to kill civilians and did this deliberately. They did so with impunity. That was the main problem.

So, any talk about something being improper, or that some balance was disrupted, or "oh no, now the Russians will retaliate" - that’s just playing along with the Kremlin's narrative. And if someone from anonymous sources in Washington starts wringing their hands, maybe it's worth checking if they're a personal fan of Putin. From what I see in professional publications, there's no such narrative there. On the contrary, they're impressed that this was even possible.

Any talk about potential retaliation — well, what have they been doing up until now? Today, there was a rocket artillery strike on Sumy. I'm sure they consider that as their retaliation. Were there similar strikes before? Since the very first days. They hit Kharkiv with Smerch rockets on the first day, if I'm not mistaken. The enemy also showed a strike on Dnipro with the Oreshnik system - it was a rehearsal for a nuclear strike. They demonstrated a willingness to wipe out a city of a million people.

— So it turns out that Russia has fewer tools: fewer aircraft, and fewer missiles, but the situation with Shaheds is still grim?

— Look, they are increasing the production of Shaheds. If you look into the numbers, how many were launched at Ukraine in April and May — there's no exponential growth. There is a percentage growth. They are steadily ramping up Shahed production. We've shown that we are capable of finding very painful asymmetric solutions for the enemy - solutions that are not obvious. Recently, there was an attack on Dubna, in the northern Moscow region, where a state-of-the-art drone factory was destroyed. That was a unique operation. The area is heavily protected.

Despite everything, a Shahed carries up to 90 kilograms of explosives. The Kh-101 carries a significantly larger warhead. And some targets can only be struck with a cruise missile. The enemy is waging war against civilians. We shouldn't downplay this by saying, "Well, they've lost planes but still have Shaheds." That's just extreme pessimism.

It should be recalled that on June 1, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted a historic operation called Spiderweb, using drones to attack the Russian military airfields Olenya, Belaya, Dyagilevo, and Ivanovo. Among the targeted aircraft were the A-50, Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160.

The head of the SBU, Vasyl Malyuk, led the task force that had been preparing the special operation for more than a year and a half. As a result, SBU drones struck targets at four separate Russian military airfields. According to the Security Service, the strikes affected 34% of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers stationed at key airbases.

Spiderweb was conducted simultaneously across three time zones and was extremely complex in terms of logistics. First, the SBU transported FPV drones into Russia, followed later by mobile wooden houses. Once on Russian territory, the drones were hidden under the roofs of these houses, which were placed on cargo trucks. At the right moment, the roofs were remotely opened, and the drones took off to strike designated targets — Russian bombers.

According to the head of the SBU, the estimated value of the destroyed strategic aviation assets exceeds $7 billion.

After processing and verifying additional data from various sources, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that the total losses of Russia amounted to 41 military aircraft, including strategic bombers and other types of combat aircraft.