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Hit to Putin: Why Trump's oil tariffs are threat to Kremlin

Hit to Putin: Why Trump's oil tariffs are threat to Kremlin Donald Trump plans to impose tariffs on Russian oil (Photo: Getty Images)

Donald Trump intends to increase pressure on Russia by threatening secondary sanctions against countries buying Russian oil. Experts doubt Trump's determination to implement these measures due to the risk of destabilizing the global market — more details in RBC-Ukraine's report below.

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US President Donald Trump intends to ramp up pressure on Russia to secure Moscow's agreement to a ceasefire in Ukraine. Recently, the White House leader promised to impose tariffs on Russian oil and, essentially, on all goods from countries that continue to purchase Russian oil. In effect, these are secondary sanctions—penalties against countries that maintain partnerships with a nation already under sanctions.

Trump stated that 25-50% tariffs could be imposed at any moment and would take effect within a month. "That means if you buy oil from Russia, you cannot do business in the US," he declared.

Trump mentioned that he was "outraged" by Vladimir Putin’s claim that Volodymyr Zelenskyy was supposedly an illegitimate president of Ukraine. However, he also noted that he would prefer not to resort to such measures to avoid harming Russia.

"If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia's fault — which it might not be — but if I think it was Russia’s fault, I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia," Trump stated on March 30.

The next day, the US president again expressed hope that Putin would agree to a deal to end the war, making the oil tariffs unnecessary. "I don’t want to go secondary tariffs on his oil," Trump said.

Trump had announced plans for additional large-scale sanctions earlier in March. If Moscow resists a ceasefire, he vowed to tighten restrictions on the banking and energy sectors and impose new trade tariffs on Russia.

Who will be affected by US secondary sanctions

The biggest importers of Russian oil would be the first to suffer from secondary sanctions if they do not stop purchasing the commodity. In 2024, these countries included China (108.5 million tons), India (87.5 million tons), and Turkey (approximately 15.4 million tons). In the same year, these countries exported goods worth $438.9 billion, $87.4 billion, and $16.7 billion to the US. These figures significantly exceed US exports to these nations. Notably, the massive trade deficit has been a key concern for Trump's administration.

There is no doubt that if secondary sanctions are imposed as Trump describes, the impact on major importers of Russian oil will be substantial. However, the US would also feel the consequences, potentially losing nearly 17% of its imports or facing significantly higher prices on goods from China, India, and Turkey. The US would have to boost domestic production or find alternative suppliers. Yet, Trump appears prepared for this, as his entire sanctions policy aims to stimulate domestic industry.

The Trump administration has already tested secondary sanctions on Venezuela. In March, an order was signed granting the State Department authority to impose an additional 25% tariff on all imports from countries purchasing oil and gas from Venezuela. This order will take effect on April 2. In practice, these sanctions will primarily affect China, India, and Spain, the largest buyers of Venezuelan oil.

It is unlikely that this decision will be reversed, as one of the largest US oil and gas companies, Chevron, is already exiting Venezuela under pressure from the White House.

How secondary sanctions will impact Ukraine

US secondary sanctions against Russia could also affect Ukraine, which continues to transit Russian oil to refineries in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic (the latter is close to stopping its use of Russian crude). This transit remains an exception under the EU’s 2022 sanctions, which ban the purchase of Russian oil via sea routes.

Last summer, Budapest and Bratislava feared losing their oil supply due to Ukrainian sanctions against Lukoil. However, the situation was clarified, and transit continued. For Hungary and Slovakia, purchasing Russian oil is highly beneficial, as the political discounts offered by Putin allow them to pay Ukraine even the increased transit tariffs.

To maintain oil transit, Budapest has even resorted to blackmail, blocking EU funds for Ukrainian military aid and threatening to halt electricity exports. If Hungary and Slovakia stop buying Russian oil, Ukraine would lose transit revenue, which amounted to about $250 million in 2024.

However, it remains uncertain whether Hungary and Slovakia will fall under the sanctions, as the criteria for imposing them have yet to be determined. These will depend on the level of US understanding of potentially sanctioned countries and possibly even on the personal relationships between their leaders. So far, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico have good relations with Trump. Orbán even met with Trump in 2024 at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, later speaking of "great plans for the future" and emphasizing shared goals and visions.

Fico met with Trump in February 2025 to discuss various issues, including tariffs Trump planned to impose on Europe. This drew criticism from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who, according to Fico, called him an "idiot" for such negotiations.

Sanctions implementation still in question

Experts remain highly skeptical about the likelihood of secondary sanctions on Russia's partners. Even Trump's statement on this raises doubts, noted Mykhailo Gonchar, president of the Center for Global Studies "Strategy XXI," in a comment to RBC-Ukraine. According to him, the phrasing used to announce the sanctions is concerning.

"I think this is just empty rhetoric for now," Gonchar said. However, if secondary sanctions are introduced, they will likely have an effect, leading to a reduction in Russian oil imports. Gonchar recalled that China and India halted purchases of Russian oil scheduled for March delivery in January due to rising freight costs amid US sanctions. "If this situation repeats due to new comprehensive sanctions, it will work. But I doubt that he (Trump) will dare to go that far," the expert noted.

The general approach to oil sanctions has not changed — the G7 introduced them. At the same time, the restrictions were not supposed to destabilize the global oil market. Gonchar emphasized that the rejection of Russian oil was meant to be gradual. And there were opportunities for that.

"Russian oil needed to be phased out and could have been replaced. There were and still are spare production capacities on the Arabian Peninsula. But the approach was different and has not changed. I have doubts about whether it will change under Trump's threats," Gonchar said.

Not all US initiatives are being implemented yet. There is still no agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia on lowering oil prices, despite Trump discussing it back in January. "So far, there is no such interaction. The Saudis have not received clear security guarantees from the US and continue to work with the Russians," Gonchar noted.

The drop in oil prices by nearly $10 at the beginning of the year is not directly linked to specific sanctions but to market reactions to US tariff policy promises. "This results from the chaos he (Trump) is creating with tariff policy. Right now, it is unclear what to prepare for, and in such turbulent conditions, raw material prices drop," the expert explained.

If tariffs increase as the US promises, production will decline. And if production declines, so does the need for energy resources. "But for now, it is unclear how and on what the US will impose tariffs. As a result, industrial programs that require energy resources cannot be confirmed, and it is unclear what products will be needed and in what volumes. Accordingly, oil purchases decline," Gonchar noted.

Olexandr Parashchiy, head of the analytical department at Concorde Capital, called Trump's statement ambiguous. However, if secondary sanctions are indeed imposed, they could significantly reduce Russia's oil sales and, consequently, its revenues.

"If it truly involves tariffs against countries that buy Russian oil, this could be a powerful tool to pressure the Russians. It could lead to a complete abandonment of Russian oil by its biggest buyers (primarily China and India). If such sanctions take effect, Russia will have nowhere to sell its oil, and the consequences for them will be severe," Parashchiy told RBC-Ukraine. However, this would lead to higher oil prices on global markets, affecting both the global economy and the US economy directly, the expert noted.

Oil prices are responding weakly to news about potential secondary sanctions. "That is, the market does not believe that Trump will impose such sanctions," Parashchiy said. This makes sense, as even if Russia does not reach a peace agreement, the decision to sanction will ultimately be up to the US president. "It will be Trump's decision regardless of how Russia behaves. He can always 'feel that Putin acted correctly,'" Parashchiy noted. But if tariffs are introduced, the market could face serious price shocks.

The analyst believes that Trump has left himself ample room for maneuver. The main question is whether the US president is willing to risk destabilizing oil prices to force Russia into negotiations.

What other pressure tools Trump has left against Russia

The White House still has instruments that it can use to increase pressure on the Russian dictator. First and foremost, the banking sector should be mentioned—not all Russian banks have been disconnected from the SWIFT international payment system. The US may insist on expanding this list as much as possible. This remains a crucial issue for Russia, as evidenced by its recent request to reintegrate "Rosselkhozbank" into the system to facilitate the export of agricultural products.

In the energy sector, a powerful tool remains — the influence on European NATO member states that are planning to build new energy blocks with the Russians. The construction of a nuclear power unit is a lucrative business since construction work costs around $5-6 billion. Additionally, the contractor company secures long-term orders for the supply of nuclear fuel, spare parts, and service work for decades. In this field, American nuclear companies and Rosatom are competitors. Washington may try to force European countries, such as Hungary, to sign contracts for the construction of nuclear blocks with American rather than Russian companies, using threats of tariffs or even exclusion from NATO.

The US may also attempt to completely exclude Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the European market, replacing it with LNG supplies from Texas.

Additionally, there are tariffs, which Trump has already mentioned. However, this is the least effective tool. Russian imports to the US have significantly declined — to about $3 billion per year. Russia continues to sell fertilizers, palladium for use in the automotive industry and electronics, titanium for the aerospace sector, and enriched uranium for American nuclear power plants.