Five war scenarios: What to expect on frontlines in 2025 and prospects for talks with Russia
Ukraine is currently unable to turn the tide on the frontlines (Photo: GettyImages)
Russia has been conducting an offensive on the front for over a year. At the same time, Western leaders are increasingly calling for negotiations and an end to the war. Even before his inauguration, the newly elected President of the United States declared that he could make it happen. What will happen with the war in 2025? Read on in the analysis by RBC-Ukraine.
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The war in 2024 did not unfold in Ukraine's favor. Delays in aid from its main ally - the United States - combined with problems within the military itself prevented the resistance against Russia’s pressure. Moscow has been conducting an offensive operation for over a year and has made incremental progress.
Statements from Western leaders and representatives of the Ukrainian government indirectly or explicitly suggest that the war might be closer to a climax than ever - perhaps it has already begun. However, this culmination may not resemble what many anticipated in 2022 or even 2023.
What to expect in the coming months
Russia is currently focusing its efforts on capturing the southern part of the Donetsk region, particularly an area where the occupying forces achieved their most significant breakthrough in 18 months following the capture of Avdiivka. The most intense fighting areas on the front are near Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove settlements.
Velyka Novosilka, once a key point for Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023, is now semi-surrounded. North of Velyka Novosilka, Russian forces have cut off two key roads leading from the city. To the south, they regained control of some settlements along the Mokri Yaly River, which Ukrainian forces had liberated in 2023. Ukrainian troops defending the area, particularly around the village of Makarivka, face the threat of encirclement.
Kurakhove is a critical defense hub for Ukraine in southern Donetsk and is almost entirely under the aggressor's control, except for the Kurakhove power plant. South of Kurakhove, in the so-called "Kurakhove pocket," the situation is equally dire. If Kurakhove falls, Russia will likely shift its focus to Pokrovsk, with its closest positions already 6 kilometers away from the city to the south and east. In the coming months, Russian forces may also attempt to encircle Pokrovsk from the north (via Hrodivka) and the southwest before launching direct assaults.
Other critical areas areToretsk and Chasiv Yar. Battles have been ongoing in these sectors for months. Capturing these cities is part of Russia's plan to occupy the northern Donetsk region. If successful, their forces would advance toward Kostiantynivka and, later, the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. However, this operation remains in its early stages.
Ukrainian military prepares for the battle for Pokrovsk (Photo: GettyImages)
To occupy this agglomeration, the Russians need to resolve at least a few complex tasks to its north. The first task is to capture the entire left bank of the Oskil River in the Kupiansk direction, from which the enemy could advance southward along the river with a covered flank. The enemy reached the banks of the Oskil River a month ago but has not been able to expand this breakthrough due to counterattacks by our forces.
The aggressor's second unresolved task is capturing a bridgehead in the Sviatohirsk and Lyman area, from which they aimed to advance on Sloviansk in 2022. They lost control over this area in the fall of that year during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The third obstacle for the Russians is Siverskyi salient, which can still be considered the most stable section of the front, although enemy attacks have recently intensified there. Thus, battles for the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration do not yet appear to be an immediate prospect.
Another critical bridgehead, where intense fighting is ongoing, is in the Kursk region. Russian and North Korean forces are attacking this bridgehead from multiple directions: northwest, northeast, and southeast. North Korean soldiers have managed to reach Mala Loknia and breach into Plekhovo, something Russian units had previously failed to achieve. Overall, according to the publication, our forces currently control 45% of the territory in the Kursk region that they held at their peak. The Kremlin's ultimate deadline for fully expelling the Ukrainian army is set for March 1.
Two additional sectors in southern Ukraine remain concerning, as we previously RBC-Ukraine. Several informed sources confirm that Moscow has not abandoned plans to launch an offensive in Zaporizhzhia and advance toward Kherson. According to them, the enemy’s readiness for an offensive on the right bank of Kherson is higher than in Zaporizhzhia.
Ukrainian forces anticipate that the primary strike may target the area around Pyatykhatky village along the Dnipro River, which is under the responsibility of the enemy's "Dnepr" ("Dnipro") operational group. However, actions near the Hulyaipole settlement are not ruled out. As for Kherson, which also falls under the "Dnepr" group, the occupiers have already attempted to launch operations on the right bank of the Dnipro. The latest attempt occurred last week when Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups tried to breach the Antonivsky Bridge from the direction of Oleshky. These attempts were repelled.
Sources indicate that the decision to launch offensive actions in the Kherson region has already been made. This operation will be overseen by the Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Mikhail Teplinsky. According to RBC-Ukraine, approximately 4,000 assault troops may be involved in the offensive actions. These include, in particular, the 61st Separate Marine Brigade of the Russian Federation and airborne units such as the 7th Airborne Assault Division. Symbolically, it was the paratroopers who retreated from the Kherson region in the fall of 2022. There may be two directions of attack: one to the north, near Nova Kakhovka, and the other to the south of Kherson.
The start of active operations directly depends on weather conditions and the success of Russian actions in the Kursk region. To move toward Kherson, the occupiers will inevitably need to cross the Dnipro River. However, there are no intact bridges in the area, meaning they would need to use boats or establish crossings. On certain sections of the Dnipro, following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant by the aggressor, a swampy terrain has formed. During cold weather, this terrain freezes, which facilitates passage - something the enemy is also aware of.
Additionally, part of the airborne troops from the Dnipro group have been redeployed to support Russian units in the Kursk region and have not yet returned. However, some sources doubt the success of Moscow's plans, given the complexity of such an operation and the fact that the occupiers on the right bank are already being awaited.
Five scenarios for the war in 2025
The current plan of Russia is to advance wherever possible. Ukraine, for both objective and subjective reasons, cannot halt the enemy’s momentum or seize the initiative on the frontlines. For now, all trends indicate that it is unlikely to turn the situation in Ukraine's favor soon.
Most, if not all, Western leaders appear to doubt the possibility of reclaiming all our territories by force, and they are increasingly calling for peace negotiations with Russia. This idea is clearly articulated by Donald Trump and his team. The further fate of the war now largely lies in the hands of the United States. While no clear strategy for ending hostilities has yet come from the US, it is certain that immediately after the inauguration, the new White House team will actively engage in a "peace process."
Representatives of the Ukrainian government have also cautiously begun to speak of the impossibility of regaining all occupied territories by force. The rhetoric about continuing the war until Ukraine reaches its rightful 1991 borders has disappeared from their public discourse.
Similarly, Ukrainian officials have cautiously started to express their willingness to negotiate. At least, following a conversation with the Ukrainian president, Donald Trump stated that Volodymyr Zelenskyy is ready to make a deal to end the war. This likely implies some willingness to accept compromises, given Ukraine’s less-than-ideal current position. The specifics of such compromises would be determined during negotiations. Zelenskyy, for his part, after meeting with Trump, stated that Ukraine seeks a just peace and strong security guarantees that would prevent Russia from returning to war.
Three other significant factors remain unknown. First, what security guarantees Ukraine might receive in the event of a cessation of hostilities. Second, whether Russia is ready for negotiations. The White House administration has tools to compel Moscow - using either "carrots" or "sticks" - to negotiate an end to the fighting. These could include collapsing oil prices, imposing secondary sanctions on countries aiding Russia, or expanding sanctions to untouched sectors of the Russian economy. Third, whether the US is prepared to deploy these measures. Considering all these known and unknown factors, scenarios for the war’s development in 2025 can be projected.
First scenario - Trump fails to pressure Moscow into negotiations, leading to a gradual loss of interest in the “peace process,” shifting focus to domestic American issues. Aid to Ukraine either stagnates or diminishes. Ukraine continues to lose territory, and the grueling war extends into 2026.
Second scenario - The US succeeds in bringing all parties to the negotiating table. However, Putin only pretends to be ready to end the war while using the negotiation process to prolong the conflict and secure further territorial gains. During this time, attention to the war wanes, as does aid to Ukraine. Hostilities continue, and Ukraine continues to lose territory. The grueling war extends into 2026.
Donald Trump stated that he would end the war between Ukraine and Russia (Photo: GettyImages)
The first and second scenarios are supported by the fact that Putin currently has some successes on the front. Although his army is advancing at a high cost, it is making consistent progress. According to RBC-Ukraine, Russia managed to recruit 430,000 volunteers this year, with a plan for 450,000 in 2025. Why would he stop if he could occupy even more territory?
The arguments against these scenarios include the fact that ending the war in Ukraine was one of the cornerstones of Trump’s campaign. He has systematically criticized Biden for insufficient efforts, and indecisiveness, and often brought up Afghanistan, where the Taliban came to power after the US withdrawal. Ukraine could become Trump’s own “Afghanistan.” Moreover, Trump’s team has already stated that the newly elected president plans to ensure “peace through strength.”
Thus, if Trump fails to bring Putin to the negotiating table, events may unfold according to a third scenario - Trump cannot compel the Kremlin to negotiate. Instead, the US sharply increases aid and arms supplies to Ukraine. As a result, by mid-year, Ukraine transitions from defense to conducting its offensive campaign, improving its negotiating position. Then, negotiations are back on the agenda. In this scenario, hostilities might end by the end of 2025 or extend into 2026.
However, there’s a caveat in this scenario too. Putin likely understands the consequences of refusing Trump’s offer to cease hostilities. It might be more rational for him to start negotiations when persuaded rather than forced, both for the domestic audience and the international community. Moreover, another offer from Trump might not follow later.
This leads to a fourth scenario - The US succeeds in bringing everyone to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, hostilities continue during the negotiation process. Ukraine would have resources for offensive actions in 2025. If it manages a successful operation, its negotiating position improves. Hostilities might end by the end of 2025 or extend into 2026.
Alongside this, there is a fifth scenario - Trump succeeds in bringing everyone to the negotiating table, and hostilities cease during the negotiation process. By the end of 2025, Ukraine, Russia, and intermediaries agree on the parameters of a peace treaty or freezing the war.
The fact that Trump’s team might insist on a temporary ceasefire if negotiations between Russia and Ukraine become possible is in favor of this scenario. CNN previously reported this, citing its sources. Furthermore, Russia also faces internal problems pushing it toward ending hostilities. War fatigue is growing not only in Ukraine. Even minor territorial gains cost Moscow enormous losses in manpower, resources, and the economy.
Most sectors of Russia’s industry, apart from oil, are unprofitable. About 40% of Russia’s budget will go to war and defense spending next year. Due to the mass involvement of the Russian population in the war and the defense industry, unemployment is decreasing, but many civilian enterprises cannot hire workers at competitive wages and are consequently shutting down. These trends are only worsening.
Russia also faces issues with troop numbers on the front lines. Despite holding the initiative in all directions and preparing new offensives, it’s unlikely that North Korean soldiers would go to liberate the Kursk region if Putin had enough troops.
There may be another explanation - Moscow seems to have its own deadline. It is trying to advance everywhere it can. Meanwhile, soldiers from North Korea will assist with the Kursk region but are not yet involved in combat directly in Ukraine. This deadline could be Trump’s inauguration, after which negotiations are likely to begin. Until then, Putin seeks to achieve as many gains on the front as possible to have more leverage in these talks.
