Does Putin want to end the war? Division within his inner circle

Putin will not stop the war until he achieves a result he considers convincing enough to show all Russians - both the elite and the ordinary people - that he has won. His legitimacy is entirely based on the confidence of his subjects that he is strong and always victorious. He has no other sources of legitimacy. If the war ends with evidence of his inability to win, that legitimacy will quickly erode, which would be disastrous for him.

Thus, he would prefer to fight indefinitely rather than let Russians think he has lost. Currently, he has set forth demands as an ultimatum: to hand over four regions and to abandon joining NATO. I can't imagine under what conditions he would back down from these demands. He knows that any retreat would be seen as proof of his defeat, and he cannot afford that.

However, it is clear that he cannot fight indefinitely, as any prolonged colonial war eventually loses legitimacy and leads to the overthrow of the current government, and sometimes even a full-scale revolution. In Russia, this happened during World War I. Lenin wrote in 1917 that if not for the war, the revolution would not have happened for many years, possibly even decades.

This has also occurred in other countries - both authoritarian and democratic. The Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal collapsed due to the fatigue in the army from wars in Africa - in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. The Algerian War, for example, led to the fall of the Fourth Republic in France. Or consider the Vietnam War. Lyndon Johnson, who was otherwise a very strong and successful president, could not secure a second term because of the war, leading to a shift of power in the US from Democrats to Republicans.

Russia's war against Ukraine is already rapidly losing legitimacy. It is becoming an increasingly aggravating factor, and if Putin does not end it, he risks losing power. If he dies before this happens, his successor will face a harsh choice: either quickly end the war or lose power. I think Putin and his circle understand this well, but they still hope that Ukraine and the West will tire before a revolution occurs in Russia. This is the essence of his strategy. And he certainly won't voluntarily admit that he has lost the war he started.

Putin is now talking about negotiations because there is a growing demand in Russian society and worldwide for an end to the war. He wants to convince everyone that he is not some fool who enjoys fighting. He wants to convince everyone that he is fighting out of necessity and that he only dreams of peace. Putin fears that as fatigue accumulates, both the elites and the general public will reluctantly conclude: "Since we are tired of the war, since the country's resources are depleted, and Putin does not want to stop the war, we are against Putin." So, he sends the signal: "If you want to stop the war, that doesn't mean you have to be against me. I also want to stop it, so you just need to be patient and wait - I'll end it as soon as possible." He actually took this position at the start of his election campaign at the end of last year.

The same applies to international public opinion. By sending such signals, he makes it easier for his allies, like Carlson, Trump, and Orbán, to argue with the likes of Biden, saying, "Stop demonizing Putin; he also wants peace."

Among Putin's elites, not everyone is happy with what is happening. As soon as it became clear that the war was dragging on and a quick victory was not possible, serious internal contradictions arose about what to do next. A new divide has emerged over the old clans - factions of "hawks" and so-called "technocrats." The hawks say, "If we have started fighting, we must fully mobilize the economy, put the country on a war footing; mobilizing the economy is impossible without nationalization - so let's nationalize the economy." In other words, "everything for the front, everything for victory" - this is what is called "total war." And for all those dissatisfied - the harshest repression. The technocrats say, "None of this is necessary; we don't even have a war, just a Special Military Operation (SVO), so we'll continue in the same format - without any mobilization or militarization." In their view, there is no need to reorganize the country's life; it is enough to allocate a specific budget for the SVO, and that will suffice for success. The "technocrats" do not believe that they need to set themselves global goals: they are satisfied with a Kherson, and they do not aspire to Kyiv.

Currently, there is a new trend among the Russian elites: it can be called preparing for a generational change. The second generation of the Putin elite - those who were too young or did not play a significant role in the early 2000s, like Belousov - is beginning to cluster around Katerina Tikhonova (Putin's daughter). Trying to answer the questions "who is to blame?" and "what to do?" these people are starting to oppose themselves to the first generation that came with Putin 25 years ago - all these Kovalchuks, Rotenbergs, Patrushevs. They blame them for the system's inefficiency and corruption, its inability to deal with Ukraine, overcome the sanctions, and so on. However, the "Tikhonovites" are undoubtedly loyal to Putin.

They are now trying to form their agenda. They are looking for something to offer the country as a strategy. For now, they lean toward state ownership of the economy, building patriotic socialism, as they call it.

The "hawks" also spoke about the nationalization of the economy, but in their version, it was more of a way to quickly mobilize resources that could be directed to the war. The "Tikhonovites," however, approach this matter more through the prism of a long-term strategy and ideology. For them, this is not just a way to plug a hole quickly, but a mechanism to restore trust between society and the government; a way to overcome the legitimacy crisis, and restore a social foundation on which they can rule long and happily. In their opinion, stealing on the same scale as before is unacceptable, as it could lead to a complete loss of trust and the collapse of the regime; they argue that sharing is necessary and that strong social programs are needed, like in the Soviet Union.

This group includes all the former members of the Federal Protective Service (FSO), the president's security - presidential aides Alexei Dyumin and Dmitry Mironov, head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations Alexander Kurenkov, new customs chief Valery Pikalev, governor of Astrakhan region Igor Babushkin. The group also includes Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund Kirill Dmitriev (who has risen significantly in Putin's eyes over the past year and, incidentally, is married to a close friend of Katerina Tikhonova), the new Deputy Defense Minister Fradkov, and Viktor Khmarin of RusHydro, PJSC. Vice Premier Alexander Novak is drifting toward this group, and close to them is the first deputy director of the FSB, Sergei Korolev. Medinsky is responsible for ideology, and Belousov for strategy.

Regarding the war, the "Tikhonovites" take no position. They cannot criticize it, nor do they want to praise it. This is not their war. So they sort of put it aside and think about long-term strategies as if there is no war. I think when power passes to them, the "Tikhonovites" will end the war. Why do they need it? Putin needs it to prove how tough he is, but after he leaves, they won't need it. Even Katerina won't. Why prematurely burn resources and alienate society? Yes, they are all loyal now. None of them questions Putin's thesis that Ukrainians are enemies. But since they didn't start all this, once entrenched in power, they will use any argument that the war has dragged on too long and needs to end.

Translated by Kateryna Danishevska