Russia not to abandon occupation of Pokrovsk, even at cost of significant losses - ISW
The Russian Armed Forces Command is likely to continue sacrificing equipment and personnel for tactical territorial gains at a slow pace during offensive operations to capture Pokrovsk until 2025, reports the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
The Institute believes that the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon the offensive on Pokrovsk, even at the cost of significant losses, as it supports Russia's broader long-term goal of capturing the entire Donetsk region.
Situation around Pokrovsk
The ISW noted that Russian forces have resumed offensive operations aimed at capturing the city of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region. The Russian army carried out a turning maneuver from the south after successfully expanding its positions to the south and southeast of the city.
At the end of November 2024, Russian troops, including elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), began advancing further west and northwest from Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) along the Petrivka-Pustynka-Zhovte line south of Pokrovsk. This occurred after the aggressor primarily focused its offensive efforts on expanding the frontline south of Selydove and eliminating Ukrainian military strongholds to the north and south of Kurakhove.
The ISW noted that recently Russian forces captured Novopustynka (to the southwest of Pokrovsk and west of Zhovte) and advanced to the southern outskirts of the village of Shevchenko (north of Zhovte). Geolocated footage released on December 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novotroitske (west of Novopustynka) and along the T0515 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynopil highway towards Shevchenko.
Russian military bloggers reported ongoing battles towards Shevchenko and in the village center, claiming that Russian troops either advanced north of Novotroitske or captured the entire settlement. However, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) could not find confirmation of these claims.
Russian bloggers also claim that Russian forces resumed attacks to the east of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) near Hrodivka and Mykolaivka, advancing southeast of Pokrovsk near Dachenske (east of Shevchenko), and attacking with armored support near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka (both northeast of Dachenske).
At the end of November 2024, Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets noted that Russian 90th Tank Division units (41st CAA, CMD) were advancing on the Novotroitske-Ukrainka line - a formation often redeployed by Russian military command to key sectors to exploit tactical advantages.
"Russian forces' turn north towards Shevchenko marks a notable inflection in the orientation of the Russian attacks in this area, as Russian forces mainly focused on advancing further west of Selydove in November 2024. The redeployment of elements of the 90th Tank Division and intensified Russian assaults near Dachenske and east of Myrnohrad further indicate a reprioritization of this sector of the frontline," the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) concludes.
Risk of occupation of Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka
The Russian military command is likely to believe that it has allocated sufficient personnel and equipment to capture the city of Kurakhove, as well as to occupy or bypass Velyka Novosilka and adjust the front line in the western Donetsk region in the coming weeks.
On December 6, Mashovets stated that Russian forces had likely captured Stari Terny (to the northwest of Kurakhove and on the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir). The analyst suggested that Russian forces had almost eliminated Ukrainian positions to the north of the reservoir.
" Russian forces have continued to use frontal mechanized and dismounted infantry assaults to advance slowly but gradually into eastern and central Kurakhove and south of Kurakhove into Dalne, which supports larger Russian efforts to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian pocket between Dalne and Kurakhove," analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said.
The report also notes that Russian commanders may be satisfied with the recent advances of Russian troops northwest of Vuhledar towards Kostiantynivka, and from Uspenivka to Sukhi Yaly (all along the C-051104 highway).
Analysts suggest that, according to Russian command estimates, forces will likely be able to close Ukrainian positions stretching from Kostiantynivka to Dalne and, in the coming weeks, realign the front line in the western Donetsk region along the Dachne-Sukhi Yaly line.
Non-frontline capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) also highlighted that, over the past few weeks, Russian forces have advanced to the north, east, and south of the town of Velyka Novosilka, attempting to encircle it.
Given the situation, Russian command is likely to believe that Russian forces could resume offensive operations to capture Pokrovsk, thanks to tactical successes achieved by eliminating Ukrainian positions to the north and south of Kurakhove, as well as to the north of Vuhledar.
The Institute does not rule out that Russian forces are likely attempting to bypass Pokrovsk from the west and force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, to minimize the need for Russian frontal assaults on the eastern and southern approaches to the towns.
"The Russian military command initially identified a direct assault on Pokrovsk as its primary offensive effort for its Summer-Autumn 2024 campaign but later amended their campaign design after assessing that Russian forces would be unable to seize Pokrovsk in a frontal assault," the ISW report states.
Instead, the report notes, Russian military command appears to have identified the elimination of Ukrainian positions near Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and later, Velyka Novosilka, as a prerequisite for encircling Pokrovsk from the south via Selydove.
Russian forces are likely planning to advance from the Novotroitske-Novopustynka area toward Udachne (west of Pokrovsk) and Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) in an attempt to encircle Pokrovsk from the south and west.
The ISW suggests that the Russians likely aim to cut off the T0515, T0406, and M-30 highways to the southwest and west of Pokrovsk, thereby complicating logistics and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad without the need for costly frontal assaults on the cities.
Fatigue of the army and the strain on Russia's economy
The Russian military command may redeploy forces from the directions of Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka, including additional units from the 90th Tank Division or elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]). This would be necessary to reinforce the units currently operating south of Pokrovsk.
The ISW believes that the Russian military command is likely to relocate forces from the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka areas only after Russian troops have captured or bypassed tactical objectives in these areas, to provide better geographical positioning on the battlefield.
Analysts suggest that Russian forces currently operating in the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions are likely fatigued from months of combat and may attempt to capitalize on initial tactical successes in the Pokrovsk direction.
Attempts to bypass Pokrovsk from the flanks will require significantly more time, manpower, and armored vehicles than frontal assaults on the city, as Russian forces would have to advance over long distances and capture additional settlements.
At the same time, the ISW does not rule out the possibility that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will likely try to establish a broad defense in the area. On December 7, one of the Russian military bloggers expressed concern that well-fortified defensive positions and effective operations by the Ukrainian forces, using drones near Shevchenko and Novotroitske, could complicate further Russian advances in the area.
Drone units played a decisive role in limiting Russia's ability to conduct mechanized operations on the Pokrovsk front in mid-2024, prompting the Russian military command to abandon the frontal assault on Pokrovsk in late summer 2024.
Further successful operations by Ukrainian drones may again force Russian forces to conduct exhausting infantry assaults through the urban areas of Pokrovsk in the future if Ukrainian forces manage to sufficiently delay and disrupt Russian efforts aimed at encircling the city, according to the ISW.
The ISW believes that Russian forces are likely to continue their efforts to capture Pokrovsk after the winter of 2024-2025 and into the spring of 2025. The UK Ministry of Defence recently noted that Russian troops suffered record-high losses in November 2024, averaging 1,523 losses per day and over 45,000 casualties for the month.
The continuation of intense offensive operations in Ukraine, especially in the western part of the Donetsk region, has placed an unsustainable burden on the Russian military apparatus and economy.
"Russian authorities will likely have to balance mounting personnel losses and the growing pressure to enact a deeply unpopular partial involuntary reserve callup - which would further strain Russia's labor shortages and economy - against the desire to seize Pokrovsk and the rest of Donetsk region," the Institute for the Study of War suggests.
Situation on the front and US military aid
According to the ISW war maps analysis, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have achieved success near Velyka Novosilka and advanced in the Kursk region. Meanwhile, Russian forces are making progress near Kupiansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian troops will gain access to a more secure satellite network for Starlink terminals called Starshield.
Meanwhile, the US has approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth $988 million. The package includes missiles for HIMARS, drones, and components for repairing armored vehicles.