Putin's strategy for victory through prolonging war may fail - ISW

It is noted that Putin and the Russian military command have ordered Russian troops to conduct offensive operations along the front lines in eastern and northeastern Ukraine for the year. This campaign aims to exhaust the Armed Forces and prevent them from accumulating the necessary manpower and logistical resources for conducting counteroffensive operations.

"Putin and the Russian military command likely view retaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic priority and have shown themselves to be tolerant of protracted offensive operations that result in gradual, creeping advances far short of their intended operational objectives," the report states.

The ISW also highlighted that Russian military forces are currently trying to eliminate challenges to their initiative across the theater of operations in the Kursk region while simultaneously maintaining offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine, pursuing their longstanding operational goals.

Analysts at the Institute are convinced that the intensified offensive operation by Russian troops in the summer of 2024, aimed at capturing the city of Pokrovsk and reducing the broader Ukrainian salient in the western Donetsk region, is likely to culminate in the coming months.

At the same time, the analysts forecast that despite the state of readiness of Russian forces, the Russian military command will likely continue to engage its army in overarching strategic efforts aimed at maintaining initiative across the entire theater of operations and exhausting the Armed Forces of Ukraine well before this operational climax.

"Putin's theory of victory relies on Russian forces conducting consistent offensive operations indefinitely, but these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower and materiel significantly enough that Russian forces will have to decrease offensive tempo on at least select sectors of the front - presenting Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest and perhaps seize the battlefield initiative in these areas," the report states.

Complete resource exhaustion

Additionally, analysts suggest that medium- and long-term constraints on Russia's military potential and defense industrial production will undermine the country's ability to sustain consecutive offensive operations aimed at prolonging the war and exhausting Ukraine.

The ISW observes a continuous total increase in financial incentives that the Russian government is offering for signing military contracts with the Ministry of Defense. This indicates that Russia is depleting its reserves of volunteers willing to serve and participate in the war.

"Russian authorities have reportedly expressed concerns that ongoing recruitment efforts are producing diminishing results, and Putin remains committed to avoiding another partial mobilization call-up of reservists despite growing signs of force-generation constraints," the report states.

The Institute does not rule out the possibility that Putin may initiate another wave of partial mobilization similar to that of autumn 2022. However, he will likely do so only under significant pressure or after the current crypto-mobilization campaign experiences a serious failure.

"Russian offensive operations in Ukraine have resulted in pronounced equipment losses, particularly for armored vehicles, and Russian military industrial production capacity will likely fail to replace these losses in the medium- to long-term. Russia currently relies on refurbishing a large but finite stock of Soviet-era equipment to replace its outsized losses in Ukraine and appears to be depleting stockpiles at an increased rate," the report states.

The ISW also reminded that Russia is utilizing its partnerships with North Korea and Iran to procure ammunition and military equipment, as well as cooperating with China to acquire critically important components for defense production. However, these international procurements are unlikely to meet all of Russia's logistical needs in Ukraine.

"Putin appears just as reluctant to conduct a full-scale economic mobilization as he is to conduct another mobilization wave, and it remains unclear if critical bottlenecks and worsening labor shortages would even allow Russia to rapidly and fully mobilize its economy for the war effort in the event that Putin permitted it," the ISW report concludes.