Moscow losing military bases in Syria: UK intel highlights reasons
Photo: Putin is losing Syria to Bashar al-Assad (Getty Images)
The Kremlin is attempting to present itself as a partner to the new leadership in Syria. However, Moscow's sheltering of Bashar al-Assad is hindering negotiations, according to the UK Ministry of Defense.
According to the update, on January 28 and 29, 2025, Russian vessels SPARTA II and SPARTA departed from Tartus, Russia's strategically important naval base in Syria. The two cargo ships are most likely transporting evacuated equipment and personnel to alternative locations far from the Mediterranean, escorted by four Russian navy ships.
British intelligence indicates that negotiations between Russian government representatives and the Syrian ruling administration, as well as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), regarding the future of Russian bases, are almost certainly ongoing. Russia continues engaging with HTS to strengthen ties and position itself as a beneficial partner.
"However, Russia is in a weaker negotiating position due to various factors, likely including the Syrian leadership's hostility towards the former Syrian dictator, Bashar Al-Assad, currently harbored by Russia," the report stated.
While the war with Ukraine remains Russia's primary concern, maintaining its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean almost certainly remains a strategic priority, enabling Russia to project military power in the region and sustain its operations in Africa.
"Russia's preoccupation with the Ukraine conflict likely reduced its situational awareness in Syria affecting its ability to keep the Assad regime in power, thereby undermining Russia's strategic interests in the Middle East, Mediterranean and Africa," the UK Ministry of Defence noted.
Moscow lost access to its naval base in Tartus after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime.
Currently, Syria’s new leadership is demanding that Russia hand over former President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Moscow after rebels captured Damascus in December 2024.
