Ambassador Vasyl Bodnar: Türkiye continues to be active mediator between Ukraine and Russia

Contents:

• Türkiye as a mediator
• Mutual interests of Ukraine and Türkiye
• Security in the Black Sea
• Defense cooperation
• Türkiye and sanctions against Russia

Türkiye has remained a crucial ally of Ukraine in recent years while maintaining pragmatic relations with Russia. A striking example of this balancing act is that, despite being a NATO member, Türkiye applied to join BRICS, an organization seeking to position itself as an alternative to the West.

Another sign of this balancing approach is Türkiye's continued role as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. This began with political mediation at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion and has continued through mediation on issues such as the return of hostages and negotiations over Black Sea shipping routes. Regarding the latter, Türkiye’s voice is particularly important as a regional player with ties to the Middle East and Africa.

"Türkiye has already gained substantial experience through the grain deal in 2022-2023. It has experience negotiating with Ukraine, the UN, the aggressor country, and communicating with countries in the Middle East and Africa, which are recipients of our aid and are directly dependent on deliveries or assistance from Ukraine," said Bodnar in his interview with RBC-Ukraine.

At the same time, many other critical points of cooperation between Ukraine and Türkiye exist: the defense industry, demining the Black Sea, and bilateral trade. The ambassador also elaborated on these areas in detail.

Türkiye as a mediator

– Let's start with Türkiye's diplomatic efforts in the context of the war between Ukraine and Russia. Türkiye has participated in several prisoner exchanges. However, politically, Türkiye doesn’t seem as active in its mediation role compared to the early stages of the war. Has anything changed?

– In fact, nothing has changed. Türkiye remains an active mediator. Moreover, Türkiye is institutionalizing its mediation efforts. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a dedicated department for mediation issues, and Türkiye aims to mediate in many conflicts, not just the Russia-Ukraine war. As for the release of prisoners and hostages, a multi-tiered dialogue continues.

The key here is the dialogue between the Presidents of Ukraine and Türkiye, along with communication between Ukraine’s Presidential Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense with their Turkish counterparts. In March of this year, this issue was a key topic during the presidents' meeting in Istanbul.

An important development is the recent appointment of Andrii Sybiha as Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister. Sybiha was the Ukrainian Ambassador to Türkiye from 2016 to 2021, and he understands the priorities of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Türkiye, the realities of Turkish politics, and the importance of deepening our cooperation.

Dialogue is also ongoing at the ombudsman level. In late March, Turkish Ombudsman Şeref Malkoç visited Ukraine. He met with the families of our prisoners of war and visited the detention sites of Russian POWs in Ukraine. In July, the families of the Azovstal defenders visited Türkiye and met with Mr. Malkoç. He remains in dialogue with the Russian side, coordinating the terms and conditions of his visit to Russia to meet with our prisoners of war and resolve issues of their return.

Last year, there was an idea to create a "humanitarian corridor" that would allow certain categories of Ukrainian citizens detained by the occupiers to return home via Türkiye. Unfortunately, after initially agreeing to the plan, the Russian side, following instructions from their Ministry of Defense, withdrew its agreement. However, neither Ukraine nor Türkiye has stopped its efforts in this regard.

Additionally, we are working with Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant agencies to secure the release of political hostages. This mainly concerns Crimean Tatars detained in occupied Crimea and currently held in Russian prisons. So, although there may not be major public political statements, the work continues, and the issue has never been removed from the agenda.

– What is Türkiye's position regarding President Zelenskyy's peace formula? Are there any distinctive features compared to other countries?

– Türkiye supports the implementation of the peace formula and is actively involved in it. As you know, Türkiye participated in the peace summit in Switzerland in June. It signed the relevant communiqué and is working in a group focused on food security.

Türkiye gained substantial experience with the grain deal in 2022-2023, negotiating with Ukraine, the UN, the aggressor country, and communicating with Middle Eastern and African countries that are recipients of our aid.

I would also like to remind you that we are partners in implementing the Grain from Ukraine initiative with the involvement of the World Food Program, which is a UN structure focused on ensuring food security. We are helping to deliver grain, some of which is stored in Türkiye and may be processed into ready-to-eat products, which are then sent to countries in Africa and Asia. Most recently, there was a delivery to Afghanistan through Türkiye to meet humanitarian needs.

– President Erdoğan mentioned the grain deal back in June at the NATO summit. What leverage does Türkiye have on Russia regarding this, especially since Russia pulled out of the agreement? What progress can be made here?

– Currently, Ukraine has established a corridor to export its products, including agricultural products, through the territorial waters of Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye. This corridor functions even better than the grain corridor. However, high insurance rates for the exported products remain. It is in Türkiye’s interest to restore direct communication through international waters, as it directly affects Turkish companies and Türkiye’s economy. Moreover, the issue of ensuring safer navigation conditions in the Black Sea is still relevant. Of course, these approaches do not contradict our vision.

There were negotiations about the possibility of concluding a separate agreement on the safety of navigation. Today, we are discussing this issue within the framework of point 2 of President Zelenskyy’s peace formula. We are working to ensure that this issue becomes one of the key elements in the action plan to ensure food security, which is essential for achieving full and just peace in Ukraine.

A cargo ship sailing through Turkish territorial waters (photo: Getty Images)

For the Turkish side, of course, this is an element of how Türkiye can influence Russia. Today, we need to look at the entire spectrum of bilateral relations between the two countries. Naturally, not everything may please or satisfy us, but Türkiye has its interests and is pursuing them. We are also developing our bilateral strategic partnership following our interests.

So, how can Türkiye influence Russia? First and foremost, it's a matter of cooperation in the energy sector. Today, Türkiye is one of the region's largest buyers of Russian energy resources, particularly gas and oil. This forms a way for both sides to exert influence on one another.

Secondly, there is nuclear energy, as Türkiye is currently building its first and only nuclear power plant with the help of the Russian company Rosatom. Naturally, this is an element of mutual influence. Some experts believe that this strengthens Russia's influence. Turkish officials have a slightly different view, as most of Türkiye's electricity is generated from gas, which is also supplied by Russia. Therefore, they consider this a balanced approach to meet the growing needs of Türkiye's industry without allegedly increasing dependency on Russian energy sources.

The third dimension is, of course, tourism. Every year, millions of Russian tourists visit Türkiye's southern regions, providing significant income for the local population. By regulating tourist flows, a certain level of interdependence is created in this regard.

Trade, transport, and transit from third countries also play their roles. These factors affect the volumes and quantities of goods that are transported through Türkiye or supplied. Sanctions are a relevant issue here. As you know, Türkiye has not joined the sanctions imposed by the European Union or the United States. However, Ankara is making efforts to prevent the circumvention of sanctions through Türkiye and is cooperating directly with us and Western partners. We expect all these issues to be addressed by the Turkish side.

Mutual Interests of Ukraine and Türkiye

– Regarding interdependence, let me quote a fragment from the Atlantic Council think tank: "Ankara is using a carrot-and-stick strategy, simultaneously supporting Ukraine's defense while calling for negotiations to end the war." Is this interdependence also present in Ukraine-Türkiye relations?

– Any bilateral relationship involves interdependence. Naturally, the Ukrainian transport corridor from our ports to international markets passes through Turkish territorial waters. Transit cargoes also pass through Turkish territory on their way to us by land.

Bilateral trade is actively developing. We are working on completing the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement. The Turkish parliament has already ratified it, and our Verkhovna Rada plans to ratify it soon. We expect the relevant procedures for exchanging ratification documents and launching the implementation of this agreement to take place in the fall. This is also an example of bilateral interdependence, as trade will flow in both directions. I believe that this agreement opens up more opportunities for our businesses to access Türkiye's rather closed market. The main factors are activity and a desire to enter these markets.

Important issues are also related to the defense industry and cooperation in this field. Turkish companies are already lining up to participate in projects for Ukraine's reconstruction. Türkiye’s experience in creating and operating industrial parks is of great interest to us. These parks are intended to significantly enhance Ukraine's industrial potential and create additional conditions for expanding foreign investments. For us, it is crucial that in the development of bilateral cooperation, the interests of the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian businesses, and Ukrainian citizens are always taken into account.

– You mentioned the Free Trade Agreement. Are there already estimates of how much it can increase trade between Ukraine and Türkiye? And in which sectors?

– Of course, the agreement was signed because the calculations showed the potential for growth, primarily of Ukrainian exports to Türkiye, as the current tariff restrictions on Ukrainian finished goods are quite high, ranging from 30% to 180%. These tariffs will now gradually be lifted, especially on industrial products, as more than 90% of industrial goods will be able to be supplied to Türkiye duty-free. Agricultural products are handled a bit differently, as each side protects its own market. Initially, about 7.5-8% of agricultural products will be able to be exported duty-free.

However, certain transition periods have been established, allowing specific groups of goods to pass through with reduced tariffs or quotas. This will also allow the market to be tested to see whether a particular product from one country or another poses a threat to the domestic market.

A trade committee will be created to oversee the implementation of the Agreement, chaired by two deputy ministers of trade and economy. There is already an agreement on the possibility of reviewing this agreement under more favorable conditions for us. Therefore, work is ongoing in this area.

Currently, trade volume amounts to an average of over 7 billion dollars per year. The goal is to increase it to over 10 billion dollars within 2-3 years, with a growing trend, particularly focusing on Ukrainian finished products in the Turkish market.

Security in the Black Sea

– Türkiye, together with Bulgaria and Romania, recently began demining the Black Sea. How is communication with Ukraine being conducted in this regard, and is there specific cooperation?

– This is a very good initiative that is being implemented within the framework of NATO. It is important in terms of ensuring a safe route for the supply of Ukrainian products to global markets. It is a rather peaceful initiative that does not provoke the aggressor country, but at the same time, it is proactive, as it creates safer conditions for us, for the coastal NATO countries, and for those that are also part of the Black Sea.

From the very beginning of this initiative, we approached the Turkish side with a proposal to participate as a full-fledged member. Since Ukraine is a candidate for NATO membership, there were, of course, no formal objections. However, there are certain timeframes that need to be worked out with the Turkish side.

Their main concern is that our participation, whether with ships or military personnel, should not pose a threat to the entire project, as the Russian side might then consider these ships potential targets for attack.

Of course, we are now developing internal communication through appropriate channels. We share the information we have about possible mined areas and how this initiative can be improved. Most likely, I think that by the end of this year, we will establish mechanisms for Ukraine’s participation in this project so that we can obtain information from first-hand sources and later apply our own capabilities.

– How has Türkiye's overall stance on security in the Black Sea changed? After all, there is the threat from Russia, minefields, and the risk of environmental disasters associated with Russia's "shadow fleet."

– There are many problems. In fact, Türkiye’s position changed in 2014, since the occupation of Crimea fundamentally altered the entire landscape of the Black Sea region, creating new security and navigation threats. Several projects that were implemented both bilaterally and within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization unfortunately ceased to exist due to the inability to carry them out, largely because of Russia's aggressive policies.

Naturally, Türkiye has primarily been strengthening its naval forces. In fact, thanks to the actions of Ukraine's Defense Forces, Türkiye has become the leader in the Black Sea in terms of the number of warships. For Türkiye, it is important that the Black Sea remains a zone of security, that Russian aggression stops, and that full-fledged economic cooperation can be restored for the benefit of the entire region.

Of course, until the war ends, it will be difficult to fully restore the region's competitiveness. However, we can already say that most of our interests coincide with those of Türkiye. Official Ankara unequivocally supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and does not recognize the occupation of Crimea. As you know, Türkiye is already involved in rebuilding Ukraine’s naval forces through the construction of relevant corvettes, and I believe this is just the beginning.

Defense cooperation

– You mentioned the Ada-class corvettes. At what stage is their construction? And can we expect them to be delivered to Ukraine before the war ends?

– The mentioned corvettes are the property of Ukraine, and it is up to our side to make decisions regarding them. Türkiye has contractual obligations to manufacture and deliver these ships to Ukraine, is fulfilling its obligations accordingly, and will be ready to comply as the Ukrainian side decides. Currently, the first corvette, Ivan Mazepa, is undergoing port and sea trials, and its readiness for commissioning is expected around the end of this year. Another corvette, Ivan Vyhovsky, was launched on August 1 with the participation of a Ukrainian delegation, which included Ukraine's First Lady, Olena Zelenska, Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov, and Navy Commander Oleksiy Neizhpapa. This ship is planned to be operational by 2026. Work is currently underway on equipping it, installing the power unit, armaments, and many other necessary systems, and the crew for this ship has been selected.

Of course, even if these two ships are fully combat-ready, they alone will not be able to change the operational situation in the region entirely, but they will be essential for Ukraine to rebuild its fleet. This is happening with the participation of a coalition of countries that have already agreed to transfer other ships to Ukraine. We will see when this becomes necessary, and the decision will be made by the country's leadership.

– Continuing on the maritime theme, it is known that Türkiye is interested in joint drone production with Ukraine. Specifically, the Bayraktar factory in Ukraine is in the final stages of launching. Is there interest in Ukrainian naval drones?

– Absolutely, there is interest. Türkiye is also developing its naval drone industry. The experience, manufacturing capabilities, and practical applications are of great interest to the Turkish side. Recently, we have already started discussions about the possibility of cooperation in this regard. A large exhibition is scheduled for October in Istanbul – SAHA-2024. We hope that discussions on the prospects of cooperation in this area will take place there. Of course, I won’t disclose all the details. Still, Türkiye is interested in all the products that are currently being used on the front against the Russian Federation and in all our developments. Naturally, for Türkiye, Ukraine is one of the priority partners in the defense industry.

Bayraktar TB2 in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Photo: Getty Images)

And it's not just drones – there are many other technologies, the IT sector, opportunities for using battlefield digitization experience, and many other things where Ukraine is demonstrating its leadership qualities.

– And regarding the Bayraktars?

– Work is ongoing. As soon as it is ready for launch, it will be announced. I wouldn’t want to jump ahead, as some of my words have turned into headlines that were too loud. However, the fact that such a high-tech facility will be located in Ukraine will help strengthen our defense capabilities and our export potential, as part of these products will also be exported under the label "Made in Ukraine."

Moreover, the operation of this factory will engage a significant part of our economy’s high-tech sector, including those who produce aviation engines, avionics, and many other things related to strengthening our defense and high-tech industries.

– Speaking more broadly about other Turkish companies that may participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, the most well-known is probably the Onur company, which was building roads in Ukraine. Who else is interested?

– Indeed, the Onur company is the most well-known because it never left Ukraine, stayed during the tough times, and is now participating in the restoration of road infrastructure and bridges and building certain facilities, which are being commissioned both by the private sector and the state.

In fact, the list of companies that are currently queuing up to participate in reconstruction already includes about 34-36 companies with whom we have conducted the necessary communications. There was a corresponding business forum in January. A legal framework has been established – a memorandum has been signed between the Ministry of Infrastructure on our side and the Ministry of Trade on the Turkish side.

A working group has been formed to identify priority projects. We expect a visit from this group to Ukraine in the near future, which will include representatives from both the Turkish government and businesses, who will be able to determine priority areas and work with the Ukrainian side on the implementation of these projects or related initiatives.

Minister of Transport and Infrastructure of Türkiye, Abdulkadir Uraloglu, at the Ukraine Recovery Forum in Istanbul, January 31, 2024.

The involvement of third parties is important. We have already established cooperation with the Japanese side. Last year, we even held a trilateral forum. Now, some Turkish companies have found Japanese partners with whom they are working in certain sectors to supply equipment and form specific projects for the reconstruction of various areas in Ukraine.

I would like to remind you that before the war, about 15,000 Turkish businessmen were involved in infrastructure projects, business development, production facilities, and enterprises in Ukraine, investing in the Ukrainian economy – approximately $3.5-4 billion. Part of this business continues to operate in Ukraine, and some are returning after having to leave or are bringing in new partners to participate more actively in Ukraine’s reconstruction and the supply of what is most needed for the defense and functioning of the Ukrainian economy.

Türkiye and sanctions against Russia

– Let’s talk about sanctions. Türkiye has not officially joined them, although there is information that many Turkish banks are gradually refusing to work with Russia. What is the current situation in this area?

– Türkiye has a very specific position regarding sanctions policy. Türkiye only joins sanctions imposed by the UN or the UN Security Council.

Therefore, the sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States or other institutions are considered non-binding for Türkiye. This policy has been in place since 2014. Of course, we are constantly in dialogue with Türkiye on this issue, encouraging it to take a more proactive stance, particularly regarding avoiding sanction circumvention.

This issue was quite relevant in 2022-2023 when the Russian side tried to export stolen grain from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine through Türkiye to other markets or to Türkiye. Western companies also attempted to transport dual-use goods, electronics, or other products to Russia via Türkiye.

Today, most of these flows have been stopped. The Turkish side is also interested in this to avoid secondary sanctions. We have established a bilateral dialogue on this issue. There have already been delegations in Türkiye that communicated with most government bodies involved in foreign trade and the banking sector. We have also communicated with business structures that are fully committed to cooperating to avoid companies or proposals involving sanction circumvention.

Of course, not everything can be achieved immediately; that's true. Each case is unique and follows its own path. And it's not just about Türkiye and Russia; there are also fourth or fifth countries, meaning possible deliveries to Georgia or Kazakhstan that may not reach those countries, or the recipient may be the aggressor state. Therefore, we work very meticulously with each company and each case.

There are many mechanisms, but the main one is bilateral dialogue, mutual understanding, and mutual trust.

– In this context, I’d like to ask about the so-called Russian shadow fleet of tankers transporting Russian oil.

– In fact, this is also an element of sanctions policy. And here, the most important thing is collecting information and communicating with international partners to help the Turkish side stop the operations of this shadow fleet. After all, we know the Montreux Convention, which allows any commercial ship with any cargo to pass through the straits without any restrictions.

This has been regulated since 1936, and the Turkish side is not interested in changing these rules or creating obstacles that, as they believe, could later negatively affect their economy or their right to ensure freedom of navigation through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Therefore, the dialogue continues. We, of course, are refining each case, but I think we still have a lot of work ahead of us.

– Lastly, a question about Turkish policy in the Middle East, where there is consistently high tension. How ready is Türkiye for active measures if a large-scale war breaks out? And how much could this distract it from actions in the Black Sea region?

– For Türkiye, the Middle East is a neighboring region. Naturally, it is a rather unstable region, and each escalation causes a significant reaction in Türkiye. The Turkish society reacts extremely emotionally and even aggressively to the ongoing war in Gaza, with accusations being directed at Israel and the West. This amplifies anti-Western rhetoric and anti-Western sentiment in Turkish political circles. Accordingly, the authorities cannot ignore this. There have been quite sharp statements both towards Israel and about the possibility of intervention in one way or another. Türkiye’s interest is in achieving fair conditions for a ceasefire and later a fair peace.

In this case, Türkiye considers the Middle East one of the most explosive regions and tries to influence the situation diplomatically. It is also attempting to provide humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, who, in their view, are suffering the most from the ongoing war. And, of course, Türkiye is communicating with Middle Eastern countries to prevent the outbreak of what you call a large-scale war.

Of course, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, the continuing confrontation in the South Caucasus, which has not yet been resolved, the lack of a peace agreement, and the instability in the Middle East are surrounding Türkiye with conflict zones. This is not conducive to their economy or to stability. They are making every effort to gradually extinguish the flames of war and conduct negotiations in a more restrained manner. Not everything always works out, but the work continues. This is a focus that has never fallen out of Türkiye foreign policy priorities.

Today, we see that Türkiye is actively deploying its naval power. We know that a naval base is planned to open in Somalia, Türkiye has stationed its base in Qatar, a military base in Libya, and of course, a military presence in Syria and Iraq. So, it’s not just diplomacy but diplomacy backed by military force that, in Ankara’s view, should seriously influence existing zones of instability and at least create more favorable conditions for Türkiye’s security.