New offensive? What Russia plans on battlefield and whether Putin is ready to end war

Takeaways:

• Is Russia really preparing for new offensive actions at the front?
• Which areas of the front are now key for Moscow?
• If there's no truce, will Russia be able to continue the war?
• What is Putin's real plan, and how does he want to outplay Trump and Ukraine?

Since the second half of March, Russia has intensified pressure and attacks at the front. Ukrainian military believe that in the summer, the fighting could escalate even more. All of this is happening against the backdrop of negotiations with the United States about a possible halt to the war in Ukraine.

It's already been nearly a month since Putin seemingly effectively rejected Trump's idea of an immediate ceasefire. Instead, the Russian leader allegedly agreed to consider the possibility of an energy truce and a potential ceasefire in the Black Sea.

For over a month now, White House representatives have been holding constant meetings and discussions with Russian officials. However, despite Trump's promise of swiftness in ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, this issue still looks somewhat "suspended" and uncertain.

And while officials in the White House continue to declare that Moscow seeks peace, Ukrainian soldiers whom RBC-Ukraine spoke with have doubts that Putin is actually prepared to cease hostilities anytime soon.

What is Russia preparing for

"Russia is preparing to continue putting pressure on the front everywhere it senses a weakness. Regardless of negotiations, they have their approved plans. Every commander of their troop groupings retains the task to advance. And each of them must show results. Whoever's situation looks more promising - they'll get reinforcements and reserves. It's unlikely for now that we're talking about some serious escalation or large-scale intensification of combat, but currently, they plan to maintain the current dynamics,” says one of the RBC-Ukraine sources in the Defense Forces.

First of all, Russian forces will try to advance or probe the defenses in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, believes Fedir Venislavskyi, Member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense, and Intelligence. The enemy is already conducting constant battles in several settlements in the border area of the Sumy region, but the depth of their incursion does not exceed a few kilometers. At the same time, Ukrainian units are still holding several settlements in the Kursk region.

"The Russians are seeking to create a so-called 'buffer zone' in the Sumy region's borderlands. It's quite possible that this could also concern the Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions, though so far I don't see any typical activity of the Russians there," agrees the Coordinator of the Information Resistance Group, reserve Colonel Kostiantyn Mashovets.

The Ukrainian command was concerned that for an offensive against the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, the enemy would throw in the forces that had been concentrated in the Kursk region. The Russians have not yet formed new divisions, so it's precisely the "Kursk troops" that are the main resource the enemy can currently operate with to reinforce certain front areas.

Precisely because of this threat - to stretch the enemy's forces - Ukraine's Defense Forces launched offensive actions three weeks ago in the neighboring Belgorod region, two sources in military circles explain to RBC-Ukraine. There, Ukrainian units currently control two border villages located three kilometers from our state border.

Experts also suggest the possibility of the Russians moving into the Dnipropetrovsk region - primarily not for military, but rather for propaganda purposes. This way, the Kremlin would attempt to show its domestic audience some alleged great progress in the war since it would be the first time since 2022 that Russian troops entered another Ukrainian region. However, one of the sources in the Defense Forces claims they are currently unaware of any enemy plans for offensive actions, particularly in the Dnipropetrovsk region. At the same time, the source does not rule out a scenario in which, in the event of a full occupation of the south of the Donetsk region, the enemy might not stop at what's been achieved and move further west.

Russian positions are now six kilometers from the Dnipropetrovsk region (map: DeepState)

Another potentially dangerous area could be the Zaporizhzhia direction. A month ago, the Russians launched offensive actions on the right flank - in the area of Piatykhatky and Mali Shcherbaky, as RBC-Ukraine previously predicted. At present, enemy units have managed to advance by just a few kilometers. But according to the media resource, the enemy has more extensive plans for this sector, extending at least as far as Orikhiv and towards Zaporizhzhia. Another threatening direction could be the islands on the Dnipro River in the Kherson region, where the Russians have already carried out attempted offensives and attacks over the past six months.

"There are now certain movements of the enemy in the Zaporizhzhia direction, but they are so far only of a tactical scale. That is, what concerns the Russians now is partially the Southern Operational Zone, the border areas in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, and primarily - the Eastern Operational Zone," Mashovets clarified.

This concerns the Kupiansk, Lyman directions, as well as the area of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, from where the aggressor plans to move towards Kostiantynivka. All these sectors play an important role for Russia in occupying the north of the Donetsk region.

At the same time, the capture of Kupiansk, as well as territories to its north, could simultaneously be an element of the Russian plan to create a "buffer zone" from the Kharkiv region on their border side. Another direction where the enemy will continue to concentrate its efforts remains the city of Pokrovsk, which it needs to expand the scale of control further south in the Donetsk region.

The only relatively stable frontline area in the East currently remains the Siversk sector. RBC-Ukraine's interlocutors suggest a possible intensifying of the Russian efforts in this area too, since without capturing the Siversk salient, it will be extremely difficult for Russia to move toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

"Russian forces are currently largely focusing on advancing in the Donetsk region as Russian leadership aims to occupy all of the territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Russian forces would likely continue these efforts, especially to take the rest of the Donetsk region, in the future, but will struggle to seize Ukraine's fortress belt of heavily fortified cities along the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka line," Russia analyst at ISW Christina Harward tells RBC-Ukraine.

However, according to Harward, capturing this agglomeration will be a huge challenge for Moscow, as it will require a significant amount of manpower and weaponry.

Russia's capabilities to continue war

Despite possible Putin plans at the front, Moscow's ability to continue the war even at its current pace beyond 2025 will be highly questionable. Right now, Russia is carrying out intensive infantry attacks, which are leading to heavy personnel losses. Moscow has to offer increasingly large financial incentives to its citizens to recruit enough people into the army to replenish those losses, ISW notes.

"Russia's ability to continue these crypto-mobilization efforts in the medium-term is unlikely, as the Russian economy and Kremlin coffers will struggle to continue with these high expenditures. Putin may be faced with a tough decision about conducting another highly unpopular partial involuntary reserve call-up like the one we saw in September 2022," says Harward.

Another problem Moscow will likely face in the next 12-18 months, according to ISW estimates, is the depletion of equipment stockpiles. The Russian defense-industrial base is unable to produce new vehicles or artillery systems quickly enough to replenish its current losses on the battlefield. The Kremlin largely relies on its stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment. But this is a limited resource, forecasted to run out by the end of 2025 or in 2026, ISW adds.

"Russia could lean on some of its allies and partners in the future to make up for any shortages, but there are likely limitations in these partnerships. North Korea may be willing to supply more troops, materiel, or equipment to Russia in the future, but Iran's ability to supply Russia with armored vehicles, artillery systems, or ammunition is likely inhibited by Iran's own limited defense industrial capacity and China appears so far to be unwilling to support Russia directly," Harward believes.

It will be difficult for Ukraine to continue the war - both with and without US support. But it will also not be easy for Russia. Putin and the Kremlin's leadership cannot help but realize that the further continuation of the war will drag the Russian economy down to a level from which, over the years, it just won't be able to rise.

"Theoretically, Russia could continue the war in 2025 and 2026, just like we could hold on through that time. But according to analysts, including Russian ones, if hostilities don't stop by 2026, irreversible economic processes will begin in Russia, leading to sharply negative consequences for the country. That's why for them, the window of opportunity, when they must stop the war, is 2025. But they want to do it having achieved their maximalist objectives, the ones they promoted in 2022," Venislavskyi explains.

Russia will face significant problems with personnel and weapons in 2026 if the war continues (photo: GettyImages)

All these large-scale plans of Russia at the front could indicate that Putin is ready to cease hostilities but is not prepared to give up his maximal conditions and demands, which are unacceptable for us. So, Moscow allegedly does not reject Trump's peace proposals. But it is doing everything possible to stretch them out over time, to worsen Ukraine's position and take control of the part of Ukrainian territories it claims - if not at the negotiating table, then on the ground.

"The United States no longer even talks about a long-term peace. What they need now is simply a ceasefire to show that Trump achieved what he declared during his campaign. But I think this will be situational. In my opinion, the likelihood of reaching more global peace agreements at this point isn't very high. Although the timeframe for all this to crystallize is already almost up - we have about a month left, sometime until mid-May, to see whether the Trump team's arguments can or cannot stop Russia from continuing the war," Venislavskyi believes.

The key in this triangle, USA-Ukraine-Russia, is not even how Moscow behaves. It's how Washington allows it to behave. In the Trump team, there's an obvious split between geopolitical neophytes, who still live in a "business as usual" paradigm, and real politicians who understand the division into "good and evil", "aggressor and victim".

Ideological contradictions between these two wings prevent Washington from forming a unified, tough position on the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war. As a result, it turns out that the US Secretary of State and the President's Special Envoy for Ukraine condemn Russia's actions, while another of Trump's special envoys, who communicates with the Kremlin, repeats the narratives of its propaganda.

In such a way, Putin is stalling, hoping that out of this whole triangle, Russia can hold out the longest since Trump is rushing for victories, and Ukraine, according to the Kremlin's assessment, has a smaller margin of strength. But, again, the Russian dictator is doing this only because he is still being allowed to do it. Appeasement cannot force an aggressor into peace - peace is only possible through strength against the aggressor, as was once promised by Trump's team, after all.