Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha: Russia has no right to set any conditions for a ceasefire

Last week's main event was undoubtedly the meeting between the Ukrainian and American delegations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. For the first time in recent years, the option of a temporary ceasefire appeared on the agenda — at least, such a possibility is now being considered.

However, this would a priori require the consent of the aggressor country. Russia is clearly resorting to tactics tested over years of Minsk negotiations: attempting to "talk down" any constructive initiatives and trying to turn the course of events to its advantage.

As Andrii Sybiha repeatedly emphasizes in his conversation with RBC-Ukraine, it is still necessary to wait for Moscow’s official response to the ceasefire initiative — despite numerous "signals," such a response has not yet been received.

– How realistic is the implementation of the ceasefire agreements reached in Jeddah, considering what we have already heard from Moscow and how the Americans reacted to what they heard in Moscow?

– I can tell you clearly that the Ukrainian side is ready, and the American side is ready. Recently, there has indeed been a lot of diplomatic activity, which is understandable and dictated by our strategic goal — to achieve a just and comprehensive peace for Ukraine and to end this war within this year. Therefore, naturally, we are intensifying all our diplomatic efforts at all levels.

Returning to Jeddah, these were extremely important, landmark negotiations. Based on their results, we can draw several conclusions. In the bilateral dimension of our Ukrainian-American relations, I can say with certainty that after these negotiations, we have returned to a normal diplomatic track, bilateral interaction, and further dialogue at various levels, including the highest one. That is the first point.

Second, Ukraine once again demonstrated to the whole world that it is not an obstacle to peace. These negotiations once again showed who truly wants peace and who actually wants war. By supporting the American ceasefire proposal, Ukraine demonstrated its global commitment to achieving a just peace. Therefore, diplomatically, the ball is now in Russia’s court. We are waiting for their response, but a response without conditions.

– So far, what we have heard are exactly conditions.

– Let's wait for the official response, as there is none as of today. But we are unequivocal in our position that no additional conditions should be set.

Ukraine has accepted the proposal from the American side, and accordingly, the Russian side must reciprocate.

– Do you mean that there will be an official response, not just some comments from Putin that have already been made, but something more formalized?

– There are different official forms of confirming a state's position. As of today, it has not been provided. This confirmation must be given directly to the American side.

– What timeframe can we talk about for the start of the ceasefire, at the earliest?

– This is an extremely complex process. Apart from reaching an agreement on a ceasefire, which Ukraine has now confirmed, we also face the challenge of ensuring compliance with the ceasefire and monitoring its observance.

But I need to clarify once again that we are talking about a temporary ceasefire. This is by no means a frozen conflict but a temporary ceasefire for 30 days, as stipulated in our joint statement with the American delegation.

Our bitter experience with the "Minsk process" and the ceasefires established at that time — at least 25 of them — shows that this is indeed a challenge. It indicates that we must immediately expect provocations from the Russian side. It proves that the Russians do not adhere to their commitments and that their practice is to violate these ceasefires immediately. Therefore, we truly need an effective mechanism for objective control.

Most likely, it should also include an international component. The question here is who can carry out such monitoring, as there is undoubtedly a national component — this cannot happen without us because it takes place on our territory. Therefore, Ukraine is the decisive party in overseeing and monitoring the ceasefire. As I have already stated, we have begun forming a national team that will develop the modalities and algorithms for ensuring this process.

We should also take into account our technical capabilities, which we have significantly expanded in recent years. I am referring to the drone technology for this monitoring. However, an international component is undoubtedly necessary for the objective recording of possible violations and provocations from the Russian side.

Usually, such ceasefire monitoring mechanisms operate under the umbrellas of the UN, the OSCE, or various other international institutions. Given our negative experience between 2014–2022, the feasibility and appropriateness of implementing such an international component as an element of possible monitoring of the temporary ceasefire must be carefully discussed.

This is also a subject for discussion with our European colleagues and the American side, and we are currently conducting these consultations. I personally am doing so as a minister because we need both expertise and collective diplomatic wisdom.

– It would be logical to assume that the aggressor country might say: we do not trust any monitors from Ukraine, Poland, France, or Lithuania. So if they are involved, then from our side, there will be "monitors" from Belarus, Kazakhstan, or China.

– I will not speculate on what they might come up with. There are clear understandings and clear rules on how this should be to ensure the ceasefire process. This is our position — we roughly understand the configuration. We already have enough diplomatic scars in our history to clearly understand both our national interest and the steps that are truly effective.

– How soon will we begin to understand whether things are moving toward a ceasefire or, on the contrary, in the opposite direction?

– There is no need to speculate — the key criterion is the official response from the Russian side. With these agreements reached with the American delegation, we have already taken a huge step toward achieving a just peace. Now we are waiting for the Russian response.

– And at this stage, are we waiting for steps from the American side, particularly regarding Russia? Do you allow for the possibility that the United States — if Russia starts playing the games it has always played, trying to talk the issue away — might take serious measures: sanctions, increasing assistance to us?

– We proceed from the fact that the American side is currently in contact with the Russian side to obtain this position. My opinion is that a negative response, a refusal from the Russian side regarding this proposal, presumes to apply the necessary elements of pressure on the Russians to achieve peace. And for this, I am convinced, there is the necessary diplomatic toolkit, particularly sanctions.

– Given what has been happening in recent days in the Kursk region, is Kursk still a "card" for us, in President Trump's terminology, a card we can play? And how would you assess Trump's recent appeal to Putin — to "spare" some of our military personnel who are supposedly surrounded somewhere?

– Let's rely on the official statements of our General Staff and our Commander-in-Chief, who provide the current picture and its development dynamics. Yes, Kursk remains an important factor in reaching the relevant agreements for establishing a just peace.

– Over the past 2–3 weeks, we have heard very, very many statements from our European friends about assistance to us, there has been a great deal of diplomatic activity, even by the standards of the past three years. But to what extent are these statements, as of now, backed by real actions in terms of military assistance to Ukraine?

– I draw your attention to the fact that the European side immediately, collectively welcomed the agreements in Jeddah, and as a minister, I received many messages and words of support and readiness to continue helping Ukraine implement these agreements. Likewise, we saw support for President Zelenskyy from the vast majority of European leaders. This is important because this agreement is supported by the world, by our allies.

Returning to concrete actions, it seems to me that we are now at such a dynamic geopolitical stage where Europe is increasingly realizing the need to take responsibility for its own security. This is true, and it is happening before our eyes. We see all these recent statements and initiatives about the need for rearmament, greater self-sufficiency, especially in the defense sphere, and this is good.

And here Ukraine can also play one of the key roles in building our common security architecture because, as I always say: Ukraine's security and Europe's security are inseparable.

As for specifics — yes, we already clearly understand the list of countries ready to deploy their troops as important effective elements of the future security guarantees system. So we are already at the stage of discussing the details. The details are geography, quantity, mandate. And on Saturday, a summit of this coalition took place with the participation of President Zelenskyy. There is an ongoing track along the line of Andriy Yermak, with national security advisors.

So these are no longer abstract ideas, but things that are in the stage of implementation rather than just discussion.

– Our European friends who are interested in sending their contingents — will they be ready to do so without approval, assistance, support from the Americans?

– I believe that support from the American side is extremely, critically important. We need America, we need American involvement and American leadership.

– The aggressor country has repeatedly reacted to the idea of the contingent as a non-starter, categorically rejecting it. Will we be able to break — or ignore — this resistance?

– We will do everything that corresponds to our national interest and truly guarantees Ukraine’s security for the long term.

We are not satisfied with just the absence of hostilities. Peace is not just the absence of war. We are talking about a stable, long-term, just peace with the prevention of renewed Russian aggression in the long run. That is what our efforts, together with our allies, have been directed toward.

We now have a clear, strong coalition — Ukraine is not alone.

– Is this coalition large?

– Yes.

– What are Ukraine’s red lines in any future negotiations?

– I don’t like that definition. There are fundamental things that are non-negotiable, that cannot be touched.

First — Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Ukraine will never recognize the occupied territories.

Second — no country has a veto over the Ukrainian people's choice, over Ukraine’s choice to participate in certain alliances - the European Union or NATO.

Third — there can be no restrictions on Ukraine’s defense capability, no restrictions on the strength of our army, our capacities. These are fundamental things that our partners are aware of. Russia must be held accountable. These are all elements of a comprehensive peace. And I remind you, they were also outlined in our peace formula, reflecting the approaches that define our position on the international stage.

Fundamental principles for us are: "Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine," "Nothing about Europe without Europe." And we have support here as well.

– A Western contingent is obviously one of our security guarantees. Regarding NATO — we are told that as of now, it is not on the table. What other security guarantees would Ukraine like to receive?

– NATO cannot be removed from the agenda — that is the first position.

Yes, indeed, today there is no consensus among our partners regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership, but I repeat, it is enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution, it is the strategic choice of the Ukrainian people, and the most effective security guarantee for Ukraine is NATO membership.

If we talk about other concrete, effective security guarantees — they include air patrols, the involvement of air fleets, and air defense systems from our allies.

This, of course, includes maritime security, as well as opportunities arising from naval involvement in the Black Sea. Undoubtedly, it includes support for our defense industry. We must become increasingly self-sufficient in the defense sector. We must strengthen our position to the point that the enemy clearly understands the consequences and costs of potential future provocations or aggression.

But the top priority is air defense systems, enhancing our drone capabilities, and artillery capacities — including shells and artillery. These priorities are well known, we are working with partners and focusing on achieving concrete results.

– What is the danger of the fact that the aggressor country has recently de facto emerged from the isolation it was in? We see even our reasonable Western friends, like NATO Secretary General Rutte, talking about the need to "restore relations" with Russia. Meanwhile, we hear much less about punishing the aggressor country and holding it accountable for its actions.

– I don’t completely agree with you. I believe that this diplomatic isolation continues, despite certain isolated contacts. And, of course, Putin and Russia are trying to use these contacts to legitimize themselves on the international stage, creating an image of a supposed return to normalcy.

No, this has not happened and is not happening. Sanctions continue, all sanction packages remain in place. We are talking about restricting Russia’s participation in numerous international organizations and major international events. We are talking about Russia’s diplomatic and political isolation.

And when it comes to Russia’s accountability, we are making progress in reaching agreements on establishing a special tribunal. This work is ongoing because initial macro-decisions were made, followed by a transition to more expert-level, specialized work. Now, we have reached a significant process with the prospect of accelerated progress.

– So punishing the aggressors is still on the table?

– It cannot be removed. Work on the special tribunal and the damage registry continues. There was a precedent in Finland - a Russian criminal was convicted. This is a clear example that punishing the enemy for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the genocidal policy in Ukraine is inevitable.

– What further scenarios do you see ahead of us: optimistic, pessimistic, or realistic?

– We always proceed from realistic scenarios, where the ultimate goal is to achieve a just peace. We have the support of the United States and European partners, and we have the will to make this happen. That is a very significant set of factors for the right development dynamics.

We need to engage the Global South more, so in the near future we should expect diplomatic activities of the President of Ukraine with key capitals of the Global South to prove both our position and their engagement. Personally, I will be in India this week for a security forum, where I will have a lot of meetings with the countries of the Global South, including our Indian partners.

So now everything depends on the position of the Russian side. This is also a test for that propaganda as they tried to shift it to us and accuse us of not wanting to achieve a just peace. Therefore, most of the components indicate a movement in the right direction. And it seems to me that a very good diplomatic pace has been gained, which allows us to quickly overcome obstacles and achieve concrete results.

Because Ukraine, like no other country in the world, wants to end this war this year.