Ukraine's Air Force officer Denys Smazhnyi: Russian attacks were predictable at first, but they quickly adapt

– This conversation is taking place on days when we are marking a tragic anniversary in our history. Three years ago, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What was the state of Ukrainian air defense at that time?

– At the time of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian air defense consisted of outdated Soviet-era anti-aircraft missile systems. The only advantage that saved us from Russian air attacks was a sufficient stock of surface-to-air missiles. In other words, even though the systems themselves were outdated and ineffective, we had enough missiles.

– In the first weeks of the Russian invasion, as I understand it, their aviation was still bold enough to enter deep into our airspace. Do I understand correctly?

– Yes. At that time, they attempted to penetrate deep into our territory. I believe this was primarily because they were victims of their own propaganda. At that time, enemy armed forces' speakers were reporting that all of Ukraine’s air defense had been completely destroyed, so they could enter freely and bomb our cities.

There were rather audacious Russian attempts to fly over our territory. There were cases when they reached as far as Myrhorod and Zolotonosha. Our anti-aircraft gunners were able to shoot them down even over Vasylkiv. They attempted to fly quite deep.

– When, at what point after the start of the full-scale invasion, did these attempts cease and their hostile aviation stopped entering our airspace?

– Russian pilots made their most active attempts to penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion when the occupiers aimed to capture Kyiv and advance deep into the Kharkiv region. Thanks to the active efforts of our air defense and, without exaggeration, the heroism of our anti-aircraft gunners and fighter pilots, we managed to inflict heavy losses on Russian aviation and drive it out of our airspace.

However, the Russians continued to operate quite actively in the sky — not deep within our territory, but still within the range of our anti-aircraft missile systems. The downing of enemy aircraft continued, their pilots began refusing to carry out missions, and about two months after the full-scale invasion, they completely stopped entering the range of our air defense systems.

– Also, if I understand correctly, in the first hours, Russia’s initial missile strikes were either largely or mostly directed at air defense facilities?

– Correct. The very first attacks they launched targeted anti-aircraft missile unit positions, radar troops' positions, and air bases — locations that our forces had been using for years. These were attacked. And I believe that because they struck these targets, they had the illusion that all these assets were destroyed.

– I understand that these strikes on air defense positions and facilities follow what is written in military textbooks: first, suppress the enemy’s air defense (which at that moment was Ukraine), and then proceed with a ground invasion and other operations. Clearly, Russia’s plan to suppress our air defense failed at that time. Why?

– Doctrinally, all leading armies in the world state that air defense should be suppressed first before launching ground and air operations. However, the Russians decided to act on all fronts simultaneously: in the first hours and days, they tried to destroy our air defense while simultaneously starting a ground operation. This is one of the reasons why the enemy failed to achieve its ambitious goals.

First and foremost, because we had high mobility. Thanks to high mobility and the dispersal of all our forces and assets — most of our units had been relocated elsewhere — we survived the first strike and preserved our potential. By regrouping the forces and means we had in different areas, we were able to hold back the numerically superior enemy and prevent the Russians from gaining air superiority.

– Since the Air Force units responded so quickly and efficiently to the initial strikes, am I correct in understanding that you had been preparing for an invasion and such attacks?

– Yes, we were receiving intelligence and pre-positioning our units in the most threatened areas. Besides, the military is always preparing for war: preparing alternate positions, conducting exercises on withdrawing units from under attack, repelling air assaults, live-fire drills against aerial targets, and various other training activities.

– Do you remember, in the first months after the start of the full-scale war, both civilians — activists, volunteers — as well as individual Western officials who supported us, were calling publicly and on social media for Western partners to help and close the sky over Ukraine? In a more detailed sense, it meant providing us with Patriot systems and whatever else was available.

At the time, we heard comments from Western leaders and decision-makers saying that they couldn’t provide such systems, that it was impossible, that training would take too long, and that they were too complex to master. However, as time passed, these systems began to be supplied to us — not even after a long period; it took just a year for the first Patriot battery to arrive. Why, when everyone was asking, were they not provided to us then? Why didn’t they help close the sky?

– Because no one believed in Ukraine. No one believed in Ukrainians, and no one in the world believed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Imagine this situation: we request Patriot systems and other expensive weapons, Western partners provide them, and sometime later, the Russians capture us and seize all these technologically advanced and costly weapons systems. None of our partners wanted to take that risk without confidence in our success.

But after several months of intense fighting, Ukrainians demonstrated that even with the outdated weapons we had at our disposal, we would never surrender and would fight to the end. And that is what changed our partners’ perception — they realized that Ukrainians could be trusted with weapons. So they decided to start with something smaller, something not as high-tech and advanced.

Patriot air defense system (photo: RBC-Ukraine, Vitalii Nosach)

Before we received the Patriot, we had already been receiving other anti-aircraft missile systems — both new ones, such as the modern Iris-T and NASAMS, and rather old models like Gepard, Crotale, and others. Gradually, our partners realized that we could be trusted with any weaponry. So, although with great delay, we received the Patriot and are now using it effectively.

– At that time, Western media reported that, according to their sources, Ukrainians greatly surprised foreign partners with the speed at which they mastered these systems. Is that true?

– Yes, they were shocked. First of all, we sent the most experienced and well-trained people who already knew what anti-aircraft missile systems were. So, there was no need to train them from scratch — only to retrain them for other types of weapons, which are much easier to learn and operate.

So yes, they were surprised when our defenders arrived at the courses, were given basic lessons, and responded by asking to adjust the program because they already knew everything and were ready for practical application. Western instructors quickly adapted the training program, and our soldiers mastered the new weapons very quickly.

– We had Soviet-era systems, and then we started receiving Western ones. Were there difficulties in integrating them into a unified air defense system to ensure effectiveness?

– Integrating outdated Soviet, outdated Western, and modern Western systems into a single network is quite a complex technical task. It is still being addressed through joint efforts. But the difficulties are not only at the instrumental integration level. All these systems must be embedded into a unified national air defense network: distributed by sector, positioned based on class and range, assigned specific responsibility zones, and integrated with an information-sharing and command system.

We are effectively solving this challenge because we have intelligent specialists who find unconventional solutions. We have our own software and combat control equipment, into which we have gradually integrated different types of weaponry using non-NATO communication protocols. This kind of integration is always our first step. Our priority is to ensure the most effective air defense coverage of critical infrastructure, cities, and military units with the available resources.

– But the enemy is also adapting to new challenges. What new tactics are the Russians using to bypass and breach our air defense?

– They are constantly trying. In the early stages of the war, their attacks were quite repetitive, and they didn’t learn much from their mistakes. But recently, they have been learning very fast. They change the routes and altitudes of their aerial attacks, adjust their tactics for ballistic weapons, and use a mix of different armaments, including Korean and Iranian ones. Their strategy is continuously evolving, improving, and synchronizing strikes, and we have to counteract that.

– Since the beginning of the full-scale war, we have also been using aviation to intercept aerial threats. There were public reports that Western fighter jets are also being used for this purpose. What share of intercepted enemy missiles, drones, aircraft, and helicopters is attributed to aviation today?

– I can’t provide an exact percentage right now. But for comparison, when we only had Soviet fighter jets, about 10% of all intercepted targets within air defense were taken down by them. They were not very effective in intercepting kamikaze drones due to outdated Soviet radars and inefficient missiles.

With the arrival of Western fighter jets, the situation in Ukrainian airspace has significantly improved because they have much better radars and far more effective interceptor missiles. However, we are still building up this capability. We don’t have many fighter jets yet, so our pilots are making an enormous effort to maximize their effectiveness.

– Theoretically, can these fighter jets shoot down Shaheds?

– Yes, of course. The problem with Shaheds is not interception itself but their large numbers. There are too many of them. Currently, most Shaheds are destroyed by mobile fire teams, light aviation, helicopters equipped with machine guns, and fighter jets, including Western ones, which have successfully intercepted them as well.

– What makes our air defense unique?

– Based on the number of intercepted and destroyed aerial threats over these three years, our air defense is undoubtedly one of the most effective and experienced in the world. We have built a powerful air defense system that has proven its effectiveness in high-intensity warfare.

But is it enough for our country? No. Ukraine is a vast country with numerous critical infrastructure sites. We are fighting one of the world’s most powerful armies in terms of missile weaponry and one of the strongest in terms of aviation. So we must continue expanding our air defense.

Our system is unique — it consists of a large number of both air defense (AD) and missile defense (MD) systems. At a critical moment, many nations responded by supplying us with weapons, which is why we now have dozens of different AD systems. Their uniqueness lies in their multilayered and highly effective structure.

– In terms of quantity, do we currently have more Soviet or Western air defense systems? Have the Western ones already replaced the Soviet ones?

– Western systems have not fully replaced Soviet ones — we are still using Soviet systems. The only issue is that, after three years of war, the stock of guided missiles for these systems has been significantly depleted. However, there are numerous projects — both domestic and foreign — aimed at adapting alternative missiles. So Soviet systems will continue to operate and fulfill their air defense role.

As for numbers, it’s hard to estimate. Over time, we will gradually replace all Soviet systems. In terms of system types, we now have more foreign ones, but in terms of quantity, we still have quite a lot of Soviet-era systems.

– Media reports, often citing anonymous sources, have mentioned plans for the development of a Ukrainian-made air defense system. Does the Ukrainian army currently have its own domestically produced air defense systems?

– I would say work is ongoing, and existing systems are being modernized. But at this moment, the Air Force does not yet have a fully Ukrainian-made air defense system. But intensive efforts are underway, and our defense industry is looking for ways to solve this issue quickly.