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The National security and defense council instead of the court: how the sanctions mechanism works in Ukraine

The National security and defense council instead of the court: how the sanctions mechanism works in Ukraine The National security and defense council instead of the court: how the sanctions mechanism works in Ukraine
Author: RBC Ukraine

RBC-Ukraine explores how Ukraine’s sanctions mechanism functions, whether these sanctions can be challenged in court, and why they are sometimes viewed as a tool of political pressure.

In recent months, sanctions have been imposed on numerous prominent figures, including former adviser to the Office of the President Oleksiy Arestovych, ex-President Petro Poroshenko, journalist Svitlana Kryukova, and oligarchs Ihor Kolomoyskyy, Hennadiy Boholyubov, Kostyantyn Zhevago, among many others.

Sanctions have become one of the most talked-about topics in Ukrainian political circles. Currently, over 1,500 Ukrainian citizens are subject to sanctions. Most of them—around two-thirds—hold Russian citizenship and left Ukraine long ago. However, a new trend has emerged over the past year: 135 Ukrainian citizens without dual citizenship have come under sanctions, bringing the total since the beginning of the war to 188. This means that nearly 70% of sanctions against Ukrainians without “spare passports” were imposed just in the past year.

The sanctions mechanism has become not only a central theme in political discourse but also a tool of state policy. And judging by the government’s rhetoric, there are no signs of it slowing down. On the contrary, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently announced that Ukraine is working to align its sanctions policy with that of its European partners.

Experts predict that the situation will only intensify, with the number of sanctioned citizens continuing to grow. In this article, we examine how the system operates, whether it is possible to challenge sanctions in court, and why it is sometimes regarded as a means of political pressure.

Sanctions against Ukrainian Citizens

Sanctions in Ukraine were first introduced during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko. According to Maryna Stavniychuk — a distinguished Ukrainian lawyer and a member of the Venice Commission from 2009 to 2013 — it was his administration that initiated this practice. “It was a populist idea. Even back then, we repeatedly warned that such an approach was unacceptable. It needed to be properly formalized and subject to mandatory judicial review. However, those warnings were ignored — and now we are facing the consequences,” Stavniychuk stated.

While under Poroshenko, sanctions were mostly applied to legal entities, the practice of sanctioning individuals gained significant momentum during the presidency of Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Initially, sanctions were imposed for a period of three years, but more recently their duration has been extended to ten years. These sanctions affect nearly all aspects of daily life: sanctioned individuals lose the right to use their property, manage their bank accounts, hold official employment, or launch media outlets. Moreover, they are even prohibited from using public transportation, including Ukrzaliznytsia trains.

However, according to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the President’s Commissioner for Sanctions Policy, mechanisms are currently being developed to allow sanctioned individuals to meet their basic needs.

“The European Union emphasizes the importance of ensuring that assets frozen by sanctions can be used to cover essential needs — such as food, housing, medical care, legal services, salaries, and taxes. Some of these categories are already outlined in Part 4, Article 4 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Sanctions,’ and solutions are being developed for the rest,” Vlasiuk explained.

Oleksandr Leshchenko, managing partner at Leshchenko & Partners and a lawyer who represents sanctioned Ukrainian citizens in court, believes that the current sanctions mechanism in Ukraine is legally vulnerable and does not comply with national legislation. According to him, the existing approach to imposing sanctions violates the fundamental principles of the rule of law and goes beyond the procedures outlined in the legislation.

“The Law ‘On Sanctions’ clearly states that restrictions apply to foreign entities — such as foreign states, foreign legal entities, foreigners, stateless persons, or anyone engaged in terrorist activity. As for Ukrainian entities, sanctions are allowed only in exceptional cases — for instance, if a legal entity is controlled by a foreign company or non-resident individual, or if a Ukrainian citizen is involved in terrorist activities,” Leshchenko noted.

The lawyer emphasizes that the exception allowing the application of sanctions to Ukrainian citizens must not be merely formal but substantiated by concrete circumstances — in particular, by the individual's inclusion in the Actual list of persons related to terrorist activity or persons to whom international sanctions were applied, published on the website of the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine.

“The definition of terrorist activity in Ukrainian legislation is excessively broad, and criminal liability can only arise on the basis of a court conviction. Therefore, imposing sanctions without a judicial determination of guilt constitutes a direct violation of the presumption of innocence, as guaranteed by Article 62 of the Constitution of Ukraine,” Leshchenko notes.

The de facto substitution of the judicial system with the National Security and Defense Council's (NSDC) sanctions mechanism raises concerns not only about its legality but also about the viability of classical institutions of justice. According to Leshchenko, the current practice encroaches on the domain of criminal law — despite lacking the formal authority to do so.

“All these sanctions against Ukrainian citizens are unlawful. In many cases, there is no evidence that these individuals committed any offense, yet they are being accused and subjected to sanctions. If they are Ukrainian citizens who have committed crimes, they should be prosecuted, and their guilt proven in accordance with the Criminal Code of Ukraine — not subjected to extrajudicial restrictions,” he stresses.

Meanwhile, according to data from the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, the budget allocated to the judiciary for 2025 amounts to UAH 22.0953 billion, up from UAH 20.6012 billion in 2024.

Legal concerns are also compounded by political suspicions. Sanctions are increasingly viewed as a convenient tool for sidelining political opponents.

“Poroshenko said he can’t pay taxes. That’s a serious issue. He won’t be able to register as a party candidate or open an election fund — everything is blocked. And I wouldn’t be surprised if the next target is Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko. If he so much as hints at political ambitions, sanctions will follow immediately,” said lawyer Rostyslav Kravets.

How the Procedure Works

One of the most controversial and heavily criticized aspects among legal experts remains the procedure itself and the legal grounds for imposing sanctions.

Under current procedure, the sanctions lists reviewed by members of the NSDC are compiled based on proposals submitted by one of four entities: the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Bank, the relevant ministries, or the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)—with the SBU being the most frequent initiator.

Once compiled, the proposal is submitted to the NSDC for consideration. The Council members vote, and the president then signs a decree enacting the sanctions. However, because the law does not define a clear mechanism—such as what form the submission should take or what evidence must accompany it—the submitting authorities have broad discretion to formulate the rationale as they see fit.

Presidential decrees also lack a standardized format: some do not even mention the citizenship of the individuals under sanctions, while others include detailed information such as place of birth; some list professional backgrounds, while others provide passport numbers.

Lawyer Oleksandr Leshchenko stresses that current legislation fails to establish clear requirements for the content of sanction proposals or the rights of individuals targeted by such measures.

“The Law ‘On Sanctions’ says nothing about the specific mechanisms for implementation: what must be included in a sanctions proposal, which circumstances need to be described, what evidence must support it, or what rights the sanctioned individual is entitled to,” Leshchenko explains.

In practice, this legal vacuum often results in arbitrary restrictions—imposed without proper evidence and without adherence to any procedural safeguards.

“The grounds are often reduced to vague assumptions, without any concrete evidence. And when it comes to reviewing the case on its merits, SBU officers fill it with various ‘junk’ labeled ‘for official use only.’ As a result, instead of fully reviewing the materials, the lawyer is forced to copy the texts by hand — even word for word,” Leshchenko emphasizes.

Statements by former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and ex-member of the National Security and Defense Council, Dmytro Razumkov, who opposed personal sanctions against Ukrainian citizens while in office, also point to legal violations: “There were cases where the NSDC made a decision, but the presidential decree appeared only a few days later. This delay allowed sanctioned individuals to re-register property, withdraw funds, or transfer assets to ‘nominees,’” Razumkov said.

There have also been instances where certain individuals were unexpectedly fortunate — the sanctions against them were not extended. For example, in 2024, the NSDC decided not to renew the restrictions against most of the so-called ‘smuggling kings’, who had been sanctioned back in 2021. Among those who were removed from the sanctions list were Volodymyr Polusytok, Denys Aminiev, Eduard Kukoba, Mykhailo Hrybanov, and Yuriy Dvorak. In addition, Seyar Kurshutov, who topped the list in Presidential Decree No. 169/2021, also managed to escape sanctions.

Another troubling aspect of current sanctions practice is the secrecy surrounding the rationale for their application. Judicial proceedings reveal that government bodies often refuse to provide the defense access to the materials used as the basis for imposing sanctions. This deprives individuals of the opportunity to mount a proper legal defense and violates the principle of adversarial proceedings.

“According to the Law ‘On Information’, government agencies are prohibited from concealing data related to crimes. But in practice, the NSDC conceals the substance of the accusations — while at the same time openly publishing passport numbers and tax identification codes in the annexes to their decisions enacted by presidential decrees. This kind of data could easily be exploited by fraudsters, but no one seems to be concerned,” notes Leshchenko.

In his view, this selective publicity not only violates the rights of individuals but also poses a direct risk to their personal safety.

Judicial Appeal against Sanctions

A year ago, Judge Oleh Tkachuk of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine reported that since 2017, the Court has handled 461 cases challenging presidential decrees on the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions). Of these, 256 cases remain pending. These involve both Ukrainian citizens and foreign nationals.

The Grand Chamber, acting as an appellate court, reviewed 44 cases. At that time, the Supreme Court had issued the following rulings: 27 decisions to dismiss the claim; 1 decision to uphold the claim; 46 cases closed; 3 refusals to open proceedings; 67 cases left without consideration; 61 claims returned to the plaintiffs. According to RBC-Ukraine, there has since been at least one additional ruling in favor of sanctioned individuals, though the names of the claimants remain confidential. At the time of publication, a formal request for clarification had not been addressed by the Supreme Court.

According to lawyer Rostyslav Kravets, new lawsuits challenging sanctions decisions are filed with the Supreme Court almost every half hour.

“There are currently about 1,000 such cases. Around 80% of them are proceedings against the President of Ukraine, specifically concerning sanctions-related decrees,” Kravets stated.

The process of appealing sanctions in the Supreme Court remains as complex and opaque as the process of imposing them. Proceedings are frequently and artificially delayed, often transferred to ‘classified’ status.

“We are dealing with a situation where the courts are unable to begin hearings because the Security Service of Ukraine constantly supplements the case files, submits additional evidence, delays the hearings, and classifies key information in order to stall the process,” explains Oleksiy Shevchuk, a partner at the law firm BARRISTERS, who represents a significant number of clients under sanctions.

Recently, the situation has shown some signs of progress — around 50 cases related to sanctions imposed on Ukrainian citizens have now been reviewed. However, only two claims were upheld, resulting in the lifting of sanctions. One of those rulings was later overturned by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court.

Despite this, lawyers remain pessimistic about both the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the European Court of Human Rights as effective avenues for justice.

“The prospect of appealing to the European Court is extremely lengthy. The core problem is that a decision is needed now, not in ten years. In ten years, the ruling will be irrelevant. And recently, the European Court has often stated that simply acknowledging the illegality of sanctions is sufficient compensation — and nothing more. So, as things stand today, there's no point in relying on the European Court, just as there's little point in relying on the Ukrainian courts,” said lawyer Rostyslav Kravets.

A separate area of concern is the absence of legal safeguards preventing the reimposition of sanctions. Even if a court overturns a sanctions decision, nothing legally prevents the president from reapplying similar sanctions.

“There is not a single provision in the law that limits the President of Ukraine from reimposing sanctions. It can be done a hundred times — or a million,” notes lawyer Oleksandr Leshchenko.

Formally, individuals who believe their rights have been violated may also file a complaint with the Human Rights Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada. However, this avenue offers very limited practical recourse. Former Ombudsperson Valeria Lutkovska explains that the commissioner's role in such matters is purely advisory.

“If a sanctioned individual complains of violations of fundamental rights — such as interference in personal or property life — the ombudsman can only draft a special report to the Verkhovna Rada and urge legislative resolution. And that’s it,” she concludes.

Who Will Be Held Responsible

Former Chairman of the Supreme Court Vsevolod Knyazev believes that a shift in judicial practice will only occur if there is a significant reduction in political influence over these processes. “Or after the European Court of Human Rights delivers its assessment. Personally, I have no doubt what that assessment will be. However, such cases are not a priority for the ECHR, so this will not happen anytime soon,” the former judge commented.

However, according to former Verkhovna Rada Speaker and former NSDC member Dmytro Razumkov, the current kaleidoscope of sanctions decisions will inevitably trigger a wave of Supreme Court verdicts. For now, he says, most judges are too fearful to make any rulings.

“There are many decent judges, but within the current system, they are afraid to issue appropriate decisions, knowing that the consequences could include not only criminal investigations, but even the mobilization of their children or other forms of pressure. They don’t want to hand down knowingly unlawful decisions — because they understand they may eventually be held accountable. At the same time, they are reluctant to rule in favor of Ukrainian citizens due to fear of serious repercussions. So instead, they simply delay the proceedings,” Razumkov explained.

His claims are backed by evidence. According to judicial registry data, there have already been court precedents in which NSDC sanctions were overturned — but not without controversy.

One of the earliest high-profile cases involved French citizen Duray Louis-Michel, who worked for BNP Paribas until 2022. He won his case at the first instance of the Supreme Court against President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, successfully challenging the sanctions imposed on him.

A second notable case is that of Probike Plus LLC, in which the court upheld the company’s claim, ruled the presidential decree imposing personal sanctions unlawful, and annulled it.

Shortly afterward, media reports revealed that Volodymyr Kravchuk, a judge of the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court and a member of the Council of Judges of Ukraine, had informed the High Council of Justice that he had faced pressure from the SBU.

The matter in question was precisely the Probike Plus case, where Kravchuk served as presiding judge. After the judicial panel fully upheld the company’s claim and declared the presidential sanctions decree illegal, the SBU revoked Kravchuk’s clearance to access state secrets. Later, Supreme Court President Stanislav Kravchenko issued an order formally terminating his access to classified information.

Public debate has increasingly turned not only to court challenges against sanctions, but also to legislative initiatives aimed at introducing personal accountability for members of the NSDC. For instance, former President Petro Poroshenko has announced plans to register a draft law establishing such liability.

“I am going to register another bill — one that ensures that when we win in court and a compensation order is issued, it won’t be paid from the pockets of taxpayers, soldiers, or officers, but from the pockets of those who participated in voting for this politically motivated crackdown,” he emphasized.